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Interpretation and Institutions
Cass R. Sunstein* and Adrian Vermeule**
Abstract
To evaluate theories of interpretation, it is necessary to focus on institutional
considerations—to ask how actual judges would use any proposed approach, and to
investigate the possibility that an otherwise appealing approach will have unfortunate
dynamic effects on private and public institutions. Notwithstanding this point, blindness
to institutional considerations is pervasive. It can be found in the work of early
commentators on interpretation, including that of Jeremy Bentham; in the influential
work of H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Henry Hart and Albert Sacks; and in much
contemporary writing. This blindness to institutional considerations creates serious
problems for the underlying theories. The problems are illustrated with discussions of
many disputed issues, including the virtues and vices of formalism; the current debate
over whether administrative agencies should have greater interpretive freedom than
courts; and the roles of text, philosophy, translation, and tradition in constitutional law.
In many cases, an understanding of institutional capacities and dynamic effects should
enable diverse people, with different views about ideal legal interpretation, to agree on
what actual legal interpretation should entail.
“The courts are the capitals of law’s empire, and judges are its princes . . . .”
Ronald Dworkin1

“The design of a decision-making environment must . . . take into account not only the
possibility of error of under- and over-inclusion emanating out of a faithful application of rules in
the face of an unpredictable reality, but also the errors likely to be made by less than Solomonic
decision-makers when, released from rules, they are empowered to apply background
justifications directly to the cases they have to decide.”
Frederick Schauer2

*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of
Political Science, The University of Chicago.
**
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. For valuable comments, we are grateful to Jack Goldsmith,
Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Geoffrey Stone, David Weisbach, and workshop participants at the
University of Chicago Law School.
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Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules 151 (1991).

Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the introduction of any
color additive in food if that additive “causes cancer” in human beings or animals.3
Suppose that new technologies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that
many potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is often tiny—akin
to the risk of eating two peanuts with governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins.
Suppose, finally, that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into food,
acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging that the risk is infinitesimal,
and that if the statutory barrier were applied, it would prove absurd and fail to promote
the legislative purpose, which is to make food safer. In response, the government argues
that the statute must be interpreted literally, and that all additives that “cause cancer” are
banned. How should the court resolve the dispute?
We think that current theories of legal interpretation fail to provide an adequate
framework for thinking about questions of this sort, and that the failure reveals a serious
problem with contemporary views about interpretation in law. Typically interpretive
issues are debated at a high level of abstraction, by asking questions about the nature of
interpretation, or by making large claims about democracy, legitimacy, authority, and
constitutionalism.4 But most of the time, large-scale claims of these kinds cannot rule out
any reasonable view about interpretation. For example, it is impossible to deduce, from
such large-scale claims, an answer to a dispute about the meaning of the phrase “cause
cancer,” or indeed an answer to any of the current questions about how to approach a
statutory or constitutional text. Part of our goal here is to demonstrate the futility of
efforts to show that abstract ideals can resolve disagreements about appropriate
interpretive methods.
By contrast, we urge that it is far more promising to focus on two neglected
issues. The first has to do with institutional capacities. As we shall urge, debates over
legal interpretation cannot be sensibly resolved without attention to those capacities. The
central question is not “how, in principle, should a text be interpreted?” The question
instead is “how should certain institutions, with their distinctive abilities and limitations,
interpret certain texts?” If the relevant judges can reliably decide whether a literal
interpretation of a statutory term is absurd, the argument for rejecting literalism is greatly
strengthened; if the relevant judges are highly fallible, literalism may have some
overlooked virtues. A great deal turns as well on the attentiveness of the relevant
legislature. The second issue involves the dynamic effects of any particular approach—its
consequences for private and public actors of various sorts. If a nonliteral interpretation
of the phrase “induce cancer” would introduce a great deal of uncertainty into the system,
and reduce Congress’ incentive to make corrections, it might well be sensible to deny
exceptions in cases involving trivial risks. By drawing attention to both institutional
capacities and dynamic effects, we are suggesting the need for a kind of institutional turn
in thinking about interpretive issues.
With an emphasis on institutional capacities and dynamic effects, we will be able
to see that nearly all of the most prominent discussions of interpretation—including, for
3
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example, those by Bentham, Blackstone, H.L.A. Hart, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks,
Dworkin, Eskridge, Manning, and Richard Posner—are incomplete and unsuccessful,
simply because they tend to proceed as if the only question is how “we” should interpret
a text. Where they attend to institutional roles at all, these theorists work with an
idealized, even heroic picture of judicial capacities and, as a corollary, a jaundiced view
of the capacities of other lawmakers and interpreters, such as agencies and legislatures.
And if the spotlight is placed on institutional capacities and dynamic effects, we will find
it much easier to understand what underlies many interpretive disagreements in law, and
also to see how such disagreements might be resolved.
Consider, for example, the view, often labeled “formalistic,” which sees
legitimate interpretation as requiring fidelity to the ordinary meaning of the relevant text
when originally enacted.5 Formalism is rejected by those who insist that legitimate
interpretation includes a variety of devices designed to ensure that sense, rather than
nonsense, is made of the law.6 Many opponents of formalism urge that devices of this
kind are simply a part of how communication really works.7 But under certain
assumptions, formalism might be seen not as embodying an embarrassingly crude
understanding of communication, but as a sensible and highly pragmatic response to
institutional limits of generalist judges and institutional capacities of Congress. We
believe that in considering these debates, an institutional focus is helpful, not because it
always resolves them, but because it shows what many disputes are really about, and
because it casts light on central questions that might otherwise be obscured. At a
minimum, we urge that an appreciation of institutional capacities and dynamic effects is a
necessary part of any theory of legal interpretation. A theory that neglects those issues is
seriously incomplete. We also hope that future debates about interpretation will focus on
institutional issues, where it remains possible to make a great deal of progress, not least
by examining empirical issues, identified below, on which much remains to be learned.
Why have modern interpretive theories neglected institutional issues? This is a
large question, and we do not offer a full answer here; but we do have some speculations.
Because of their own role, judges themselves naturally ask a particular question (“how is
this text best interpreted?”), and that question naturally diverts attention from the issue of
institutional capacities. Legal education, and the legal culture more generally, invite
interpreters to ask the following role-assuming question: “If you were the judge, how
would you interpret this text?” If the question is posed in that way, institutional issues
drop out. The very form of the question makes them irrelevant. Academic observers,
usually specialists in the subject at hand, often deplore judicial decisions as “wooden” or
“formalistic,” without appreciating the risk that generalist judges, unmoored from the
text, might do even worse. Indeed it is possible that specialized interpreters should reject
formalism but that nonspecialists should embrace it; and academic specialists are unlikely
to appreciate this point. Our principal goal here is to pose the question of interpretation in
5

See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 23-25 (1998); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity
of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 36-52 (2001).
6
See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early
Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990
(2001).
7
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1990).

3

a form that will sidestep these role-related and cognitive traps, enabling interpretive
theory to highlight the neglected issues.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I is a catalogue of influential work on
interpretation. We detail the pervasive indifference, in that work, to institutional issues,
and also explain how that indifference has weakened the resulting analysis. We attempt to
draw out the neglected questions in a way that will help show the range of variables that
bear on the selection of interpretive strategies by generalist judges.
Part II responds to an obvious challenge to our claim: that judgments about
institutional issues cannot be helpful without some kind of background normative
account of interpretation. A second-best approach, one that asks about interpretive
mistakes and dynamic effects, necessarily presupposes some first-best account. This is an
important observation, and in a sense it is unexceptionable. But it fails to engage our
central point, which is not that a first-best account is worthless or irrelevant, but that it is
incomplete without a second-best account that takes account of institutional issues.
Institutional analysis is necessary to the choice of interpretive rules, even if it is
insufficient. In any case we also offer a further, more ambitious claim: Institutional
analysis may indeed be sufficient in some settings, because it may allow interpreters who
hold different commitments to converge on particular interpretive rules while bracketing
disagreements about their preferred first-best accounts.
Part III shows how a range of issues in public law might be recast if institutional
issues are brought to the forefront. We suggest that a formalist or textualist approach to
statutes might be most plausibly defended, not by controversial claims about the
Constitution or implausible claims about meaning, but through a suggestion that this
approach might produce the most sensible system of law, given the institutions that we
actually have. We are confident that the standard defenses of formalism based on first
principles are very weak; the same can be said for many of the standard challenges to
formalism, also based on first principles. We also urge that even if courts should follow
the ordinary meaning of text, it is reasonable to suggest that administrative agencies need
not, in part because agencies are specialists rather than generalists. Compared to courts,
agencies are likely to have a good sense of whether a departure from formalism will
seriously damage a regulatory scheme; hence it is appropriate to allow agencies a higher
degree of interpretive flexibility.
Moving beyond statutory interpretation, Part III applies the institutional lens to
issues of constitutional interpretation and the interpretation of common-law precedents.
We explain how attention to institutional issues might shift the debate over competing
methods of constitutional interpretation, making it necessary to ask some infrequently
posed questions about judicial capacity to implement various approaches. Although
constitutional theory has become increasingly sophisticated about large-scale institutional
questions, such as the allocation of lawmaking authority between legislatures and courts,
it has continued to neglect the role of institutional considerations in the theory of
constitutional interpretation by judges; and our analysis provides the tools needed to
repair this flaw. Finally, we offer a brief note about the common law, suggesting that
similar institutional variables very much bear on the appropriate interpretation of judicial
precedents.

4

In these and other cases, our goal is not to settle on any particular view about
what interpretation should entail, but to suggest that it is impossible to answer that
question without looking at institutional capacities of various actors and the dynamic
effects of competing approaches. We claim, in short, that a focus on institutional issues
radically reframes the analysis of legal interpretation—and that it is long past time for
those interested in interpretation to see what might be done with that reframing.
I. Interpretation Without Institutions: A Catalogue
Here we supply a panoramic tour of interpretive theory, and influential theorists,
from three periods: the English debate over common-law approaches to statutory
interpretation (Section A), the formative era of modern interpretive theory (Section B),
and contemporary accounts (Section C). Our limited objective is to document the
blindness or insensitivity to institutional considerations that pervades these theorists’
work. We make no pretense of supplying a complete and adequately nuanced intellectual
history of interpretive theory. Indeed our catalogue will have the flavor of Whig history,
praising theorists who anticipate the institutional turn and (far more often) condemning
those who do not. But our goal is not merely critical. By exploring what has been
neglected, we hope to make some movement toward the task, ventured in Parts II and III,
of isolating the issues that must be faced by an approach to interpretation that is
concerned with institutional capacities and dynamic effects.8
A. Common-law Interpretation and Bentham’s Mistake
We begin with Blackstone and Bentham, the foremost proponent and critic,
respectively, of the common-law approach to statutory interpretation. This approach has
many shades and variants, which license varying degrees of judicial freedom in
interpretation; but a central or defining idea is that judges appropriately sensitive to
legislative purposes and to the surrounding fabric of law should mold and shape statutes
with something like the sensitivity and flexibility accorded to judicial precedents. In these
respects, the common law approach is a precursor of the legal process school that came to
dominate American interpretive theory after World War II.9
Our critique, unsurprisingly, is that the common-law style of interpretation
presupposes a fanciful, even romantic account of judicial capacities, and also fails to ask
questions about likely legislative responses to different judicial approaches. We will see,
however, a major historical irony: Blackstone, the archetypal common-law interpreter,
came far closer to recognizing the suppressed institutional questions, and the institutional
case for formalist statutory interpretation, than did Bentham, the common law’s principal

8

In what follows, we will put aside the possibility that doctrines of statutory interpretation might be
legislated, rather than developed (solely) by judges in common-law fashion. See Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085 (2002). Although the
possibility is both important and interesting, past history shows that it is most unlikely that Congress will
enact rules of interpretation that will generally resolve the disputed issues of interpretive choice. For good
reason, the literature on statutory interpretation both past and present, focuses on the question of what
interpretive rules judges should use absent legislative intervention; that is our focus here as well.
9
See Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
Law (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds.) (1994).
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critic. We will also see that later theorists, such as H.L.A. Hart, followed Bentham rather
than Blackstone, and hence repeated Bentham’s mistake.
Blackstone. William Blackstone’s brief account of statutory interpretation in
Book I of the Commentaries is easily the most famous description of the common-law
style of statutory interpretation;10 Hart and Sacks featured it prominently in the legal
process materials that influenced a generation of leading academic theorists.11 The object
of interpretation, for Blackstone, is to uncover the “will of the legislator” by “exploring
his intentions,” as manifested in “signs the most natural and probable.”12 Despite this
ceremonial bow to legislative supremacy, however, the discussion quickly turns from the
words of the statute, of surrounding statutes, and the subject matter, to more fluid
interpretive sources, particularly the “reason and spirit” of the law and the Aristotelian
principle of “equity”—the latter being the power “of excepting those circumstances,
which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself would have excepted.”13
Interpretive equity, on this view, “depend[s], essentially, upon the particular
circumstances of each individual case.”14
Here are all the hallmarks of the common-law interpretive style: flexible
treatment of statutory text, based on a nuanced sensitivity to legislative intentions or
purposes and to the surrounding fabric of the common law. Especially striking is the
stylized assumption that interpretation according to the “reason” or “equity” of the statute
will capture the legislature’s true intentions, or the intentions that rational legislators
would have had if informed about the particular application at bar, as well as the
accompanying insistence that equity is necessarily a particularistic or case-specific
consideration. Under certain assumptions about institutional capacities, the common-law
style might well be best; but Blackstone says nothing in defense of those assumptions,
and fails even to acknowledge them as such. The discussion, almost until the very end,
shows remarkably little awareness of several relevant possibilities: that judges might
mistake legislative purposes; that they might do better by deferring to legislators’
expressed judgments about equity than by enforcing their own; that they might, by
treating statutes flexibly, be purchasing case-specific benefits at the price of increased
uncertainty, imposing resulting burdens on the interpretive system as a whole; that
legislators, confronted with judges refusing to invoke purposes to make sense of text,
might be more careful in advance and might make corrections as the need arises.
Consider, as one example among many, Blackstone’s remarkably casual embrace
of the absurd-results canon: the idea, in Blackstone’s words, that
where words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, we must a little
deviate from the received sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned
by Puffendorf, which enacted ‘that whoever drew blood in the streets should be
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punished with the utmost severity,’ was held after long debate not to extend to the
surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit.15
There is much to be said, pro and con, about interpretation to avoid absurd results;
the relevant institutional variables are complex,16 and we shall say a fair bit about them
here. What is important for present purposes is Blackstone’s radical institutional
blindness—his failure to identify those variables or to find them even relevant. It may
well be true that, if apprised of the surgeon’s case, the legislature would have provided a
relevant exception. But it hardly follows that the legislature would necessarily wish the
judges to provide the exception themselves, given the legislature’s failure to do so. For
many reasons, good and bad, the legislature might want to reserve to itself the authority
to correct poorly-drafted statutes. Perhaps the legislature would not trust the judges’
judgments about whether a result would be absurd; perhaps the legislature would be
willing to tolerate occasional absurdity for the sake of clarity and predictability. Nor does
it follow that, apart from the question of legislative preferences about judicial
interpretation, the best overall interpretive system would be one in which the judges
possessed this case-specific power to modify seemingly absurd statutory applications in
light of purpose, reason, and equity. To know whether that is true would require
judgments about a range of matters Blackstone fails to consider, such as the rate of
mistaken identification of absurd results and the ex ante effects of such a power on
legislative drafting; more on these matters below.
All this said, the end of Blackstone’s discussion offers a remarkable afterthought
that, although barely sketched, anticipates some critical questions for interpretive theory
by acknowledging the role of second-best considerations. “[L]aw, without equity, tho’
hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without
law; which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion
[by producing] as many different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are
differences of capacity and sentiment in the human mind.”17 In this passage “law,” cast in
opposition to equity, seems to connote a formalist style of interpretation that enforces
rules apparent on the face of statutory texts, rather than molding those texts to
background legal principles or attributed legislative purposes. The first-best, Blackstone
is suggesting, would be law and equity in an appropriate mix, distributed appropriately
across cases. But if the mix is unstable, if judges must choose between enforcing law in
all cases or doing equity in all cases, then resolute enforcement of statutory text is
preferable on second-best grounds.
On Blackstone’s account, equity without law is defective on two counts: it
“makes every judge a legislator” and introduces an unacceptable amount of uncertainty
(“most infinite confusion”) into the interpretive system. The first point is a gesture
towards the separation of lawmaking power from adjudicative power; later we will argue
that this sort of appeal is unhelpful, because it is too abstract to supply valid reasons for
or against interpretive formalism. Far more impressive and significant is the second point,
15
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an early attempt to introduce institutional considerations and ex ante effects into
interpretive theory. We will see, however, that Blackstone’s passing insight proved
infertile. Later theorists largely ignored the significance of second-best considerations.
Bentham. It is illuminating to glance at the interpretive views of Jeremy Bentham,
an imposing critic of common-law adjudication in general and of Blackstone in
particular. Bentham’s critique of Blackstone’s Commentaries develops the claim that
common-law adjudication is both incoherent and inconsistent with a rational, meaning
utilitarian, legal order. The positive side of Bentham’s program was the codification of
utilitarian legal principles, and more generally a consolidation and expansion of
legislation’s domain that would bring clarity, certainty and order to the law. Increasingly
precise and comprehensive codification would ultimately cause adjudication itself to
wither away, as citizens and officials could simply consult the code to ascertain their
legal rights and duties. In the interim, however, Bentham was intermittently aware that
statutes would contain gaps, ambiguities, and generalities ill-adapted to specific cases—
the usual sources of difficult interpretive questions. Bentham thus discussed
interpretation on several occasions, most prominently in the Comment on the
Commentaries, which contains two substantial chapters on the “Interpretation of Laws”
and the “Construction of Statutes,”18 although it is fair to say that he nowhere presents a
fully-developed account of statutory interpretation.
For our purposes the significance of Bentham’s work on interpretation lies in his
imperfect utilitarianism—in his neglect of institutional variables in his discussion of the
judicial role. Despite his piercing depiction of the sponginess of common-law
adjudication, which he equated with arbitrary judicial tyranny, Bentham failed to
transpose his critique of judicial capacities to interpretive theory in any consistent way.
The chapters on interpretation and construction in the Comment on the Commentaries
manage both to approve flexible, purposivist interpretation devoted to forwarding
legislative “ends,” on one hand, and on the other to mock the pretensions of common-law
interpretation by emphasizing what Bentham saw as the arbitrariness of judicial claims
about “reason” and “equity.” We see, for example, Bentham both supporting the absurd
results canon on purposive grounds, in Blackstone’s example of the surgeon prosecuted
for “drawing blood” in the streets,19 and also denying that the common-law judge’s
appeal to reason or reasonableness is anything other than a statement of personal
“opinion.” On the one hand, “reasonableness or unreasonableness is nothing but
conformity or nonconformity to . . . opinion.” On the other hand, “[t]he words of a
legislator are no otherwise to be regarded than inasmuch as they are expressive of his
will.”
But these positions are in tension with each other. Recall that Blackstone’s
argument for purposive, equitable interpretation assumed that reasonable legislators
18

See Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government I.9, II.2 (J.H.
Burns and H.L.A. Hart eds. 1977).
19
See id. at 111; 160. Bentham sometimes intimates that he endorses purposivism and the absurd results
canon only in cases of ambiguous statutory language, see, e.g., id. at 160,although it requires some work to
square that qualification with Blackstone’s example, so it isn’t clear how seriously we are to take it. See
also Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 155 (C.K. Ogden ed. 1987) (“urging that “laws should be
literally followed”).
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would have recognized the need for an exception, if made aware of the application at
hand. Purposivism usually attributes goals or aims by envisioning reasonable legislators
acting reasonably; certainly that is the premise for purposivism in the later legal process
account of interpretation, as we shall see.20 This may even be a necessary feature of
purposivism; it may be conceptually impossible for judges to proceed by imagining what
unreasonable legislators would do. So to deny that the judges can assess the
reasonableness or equity of some particular statutory application is also to deny
purposivism; Bentham cannot have it both ways. Conversely, Blackstone’s second-best
argument for interpretive formalism was precisely that judicial disagreement about what
is equitable would make interpretation unacceptably subjective and uncertain (because of
“differences of capacity and sentiment” across judges). Bentham fails to appreciate that
the rapier he uses to skewer the common-law judges might be turned against the
purposivist statutory interpretation he also embraces. If even Bentham—the greatest critic
of the common law and the greatest advocate of legal utilitarianism—overlooks the
significance of judicial capacities, and the systemic effects of flexible interpretation, the
institutional blindness in interpretive theory runs very deep indeed.
Why might Bentham have neglected, in his critique of common-law method, the
institutional critique of flexible interpretation? There may be a clue in his most focused
treatment of the relationship between interpretation and judicial discretion—a short
discussion in his great unpublished work on legislation, Of Laws in General. There
Bentham argues that legislative mistakes—the enactment of statutes that are
overinclusive or underinclusive relative to their purposes, due to inadvertence, lack of
foresight, or changed circumstances—require that judges possess the power to “mould[]
statutes into form.”21 Yet this power in turn created the possibility that informational
deficits or bad motives on the part of judges would pervert the legislative product and
increase legal uncertainty:
How difficult to distinguish what the legislator would have adopted had he
adverted to it, from what he actually did advert to and reject. How easy to
establish the one under pretence of looking for the other . . . . And thus sprang up
by degrees another branch of customary law, which striking its roots into the
substance of the statute law, infected it with its own characteristic obscurity,
uncertainty, and confusion.22
This is a powerful indictment of purposivism and imaginative reconstruction. On the
score of institutional sophistication, Bentham here outdoes his jurisprudential successors
of the next century, including both H.L.A. Hart and the legal process scholars; we will
see that the later accounts fail even to see the problem that Bentham poses.
Yet for this Bentham himself must take a great deal of blame. The prescriptions
he offered to cure the problems of purposivism rest on the same sort of idealized or
stylized view of institutional capacities that infects most of Blackstone’s treatment, and
that Bentham might have been expected to transcend. Bentham first suggests that “the
necessity of discretionary interpretation” can be “supersede[d]” by the development of a
20

See the discussion of Hart and Sacks below.
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22
Id. at 240.
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sufficiently perspicacious legislative code (doubtless the code developed in Bentham’s
own extensive proposals for law reform).23 But this idealizes legislative capacities, thus
reversing the characteristic error of common-law interpretation.24 Bentham himself
recognizes, both here and elsewhere, that institutional limitations on legislatures make the
project of a fully-specified code fantastic. So Bentham abashedly sketches a fallback
plan, never fully developed, whereby judges would “declare openly” the need for judicial
“alteration” of a statute in appropriate cases, and certify a proposed emendation to the
legislature; the emendation would have legal force unless “negatived” or vetoed by the
legislature within a certain time.25 Absent from the proposal is any explanation why the
judges, whose information and motivations Bentham has so powerfully impeached, will
be able to distinguish alterations from interpretations, or be willing to comply with the
plan even where alterations are identifiable as such.
Taking Blackstone and Bentham together, the striking irony is that the commonlaw jurist more nearly appreciates and anticipates the second-best justifications for
formalist, rule-bound statutory interpretation than does the great critic of the common
law. Bentham’s turn into the blind alley of complete codification, under the influence of
an idealized picture of legislative capacities, did little more than create a target for
subsequent critics, such as H.L.A. Hart, who could justify antiformalist interpretation by
pointing to the limits of legislative foresight, while overlooking the countervailing limits
on the capacities of antiformalist interpreters.
B. The Modern Era: Positivism, Purposivism, and Integrity
We now turn to the defining period of modern jurisprudence. In this period,
academic observers largely attempted to steer a middle course between formalism and
realism.26 They argued that interpretation was not merely a matter of following
established rules, but also that it was far from simple or direct policy analysis.27 For
present purposes, we focus on the critique of formalism and on the institutional blindness
of that critique—not to show that formalism is right, but to identify the issues on which
its acceptance or rejection might turn. One of the most striking features of the period is
23
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any such effort. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 884 (1930), criticizes the
conventional sources of interpretation and suggests that the real question is: “Will the inclusion of this
particular determinate in the statutory determinable lead to a desirable result?” Radin does not address the
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institutional considerations are highly relevant to the decision how to proceed. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 US
837 (1984), represents an institutionally grounded choice to leave the resolution to the relevant
administrative agency. See part IIIB below for discussion.
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that it was dominated by the work of the “legal process” school, whose central mission
was to focus attention on institutional considerations. And indeed, the legal process
materials do talk a great deal about comparative institutional competence,28 and do
discuss the relevance of agency interpretations of law.29 But even in those materials, the
question of interpretation is answered by asking about how ideal judges would proceed,
rather than by asking about how real-world judges should proceed. But to say this is to
get ahead of the story; let us begin with H.L.A. Hart, simply because his treatment of
legal interpretation can be seen as canonical.
Hart. In his treatment of mechanical jurisprudence and rule-skepticism, Hart
offers a highly influential account of the failures of formalism—an account that,
remarkably, says not a word about institutional issues.30 A chief contribution of the
account is a clear and convincing explanation of why Bentham was wrong to hope that a
rule-bound legislative code could sensibly resolve all cases that might arise under it.
What is absent is a serious treatment of how institutions should respond to the
inevitability that unexpected cases will confound the expectations of rulemakers.
Hart’s principal submission is that in hard cases, interpretive problems arise from
legislators’ “inability to anticipate.”31 In his view, a “feature of the human predicament
(and so the legislative one) is that we labour under two connected handicaps whenever
we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of
general standards to be used without further official direction on particular occasions.”32
These handicaps are “our relative ignorance of fact” and “our relative indeterminacy of
aim.”33 Mechanical jurisprudence or formalism, involving simple application of law to
fact (Bentham’s utopia), would be possibly only if “the world in which we live were
characterized only by a finite number of features, and these together with all the modes in
which they combine could be known to us.”34 But “[p]lainly this world is not our
world.”35
Hart claims that the “vice known to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism
consists in an attitude to verbally formulated rules which both seeks to disguise and to
minimize the need for . . . choice, once the general rule has been laid down.”36 This is
sometimes done by freezing “the meaning of the rule so that its general terms must have
the same meaning in every case where its applications is in question.”37 And what is
wrong with that freezing? Hart has a simple answer. He urges that this approach secures
“a measure of certainty or predictability at the cost of blindly prejudging what is to be
done in a range of future cases, about whose composition we are ignorant. We shall thus
indeed succeed in settling in advance, but also in the dark, issues which can only be
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reasonably be settled when they arise and are identified.”38 And what is wrong with
decision in the dark? Hart urges that this kind of decision forces us “to include in the
scope of a rule cases which we would wish to exclude in order to give effect to
reasonable social aims. . . .”39
Hart is entirely right to urge that the absence of legislative foresight is inevitable,
and that this can create serious problems for interpretation. But notice Hart’s apparently
unself-conscious use of word “we” to identify the interpreting authority. Of course Hart’s
readers do not constitute a community of “we’s” who have the power to adopt a mutually
agreeable approach to interpretation. And once it is seen that a system of interpretation
must be established that some “they” must apply, the assessment of “decision in the dark”
as opposed to of decision based on “to reasonable social aims” will appear in a very
different light. If we make our assessment in institutional terms, we will see that Hart is
neglecting two points. The first involves the risk of judicial blunder under one or another
approach; the second involves the dynamic effects of one or another approach to
interpretation.
Suppose, for example, that judges will err if they attempt to discern “reasonable
social aims.” At least it is conceivable, in light of human fallibility, that some judges
would do better, by the lights of many or most, if they refused to inquire into reasonable
aims. An important factor here is that it is sometimes complicated to make that inquiry;
an equally important factor is that sometimes people dispute how to answer it. Take TVA
v. Hill,40 the famous snail darter case, raising the question whether the Endangered
Species Act should be taken to block the completion of an important dam, because of the
late discovery, on the land, of an ecologically uninteresting fish. Does this application of
the ESA violate reasonable social aims? People do not agree about the answer to that
question.
In addition, a sensible system of interpretation is based on an understanding that
dynamic effects are highly likely; it sees that the judges’ approach will not be limited, in
its effects, to the immediate parties or even to the system of adjudication. Hart seems
oblivious to this point. Suppose that courts, deciding the issue in the light, will introduce
a high degree of uncertainty into the law, making it harder for people to plan their affairs.
Suppose too that if they proceed in the dark, they will create strong incentives for the
legislature, which will promptly correct the problems that arise.41 In these circumstances,
might not formalism be the most sensible path? What is most remarkable is that Hart
appears not to see the problem at all.
Hart and Sacks. Now consider the influential treatment by Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks in their enormously influential legal process materials.42 In a brilliant “note on the
rudiments of statutory interpretation,” Hart and Sacks urge that the task of interpretation
requires courts, first and foremost, to “decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the
38
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statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved,” and to “interpret
the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it
can.”43 Hart and Sacks caution that courts should not give words a meaning that their text
will not bear. But they also urge that courts should require Congress to speak clearly if it
wishes to accomplish certain ends, including “a departure from a generally prevailing
principle or policy of the law.”44 These are the building blocks for a complex system of
interpretation, in which judges treat legislators as “reasonable people proceeding
reasonably,” make “purpose” crucial to interpretation, and push statutory language,
where fairly possible, in the direction of sense and consistency with the rest of the law’s
fabric.
In the abstract, this approach seems perfectly sensible, and we will not argue that
it is indefensible here. But to evaluate it, we need to know how well judges are able to
execute the suggested approach, and how other persons and institutions will react to it.
The fact that Hart and Sacks do not explore these issues is extremely revealing, for a
primary contribution of the legal process materials was to put the spotlight on
institutional issues, and indeed to assess much of law in a pragmatic spirit. With respect
to legal interpretation, Hart and Sacks did not keep the institutional project in mind,
perhaps because of the tenacity of the common law framework with which they began.
“Purposes” are their loadstar; but purposes are hardly transparent. Is the purpose of the
Delaney Clause to eliminate carcinogenic substances from the food supply? To make
Americans safer? To improve the world? The characterization of purposes involves a
large element of discretion, and here it is necessary to know how the discretion will be
exercised. Sometimes the characterization of purposes will have a significant political or
even ideological component. Hart and Sacks pay no attention to that issue; they seem to
think that it is irrelevant.
General lessons cannot be drawn from the practice of interpretation under
Fascism, but for our purposes, some illumination can be found from the disparate
practices of Italian and German courts. The Italian judiciary, faced with a totalitarian
regime, engaged in a strategy of resistance, based on the idea of “plain meaning.” 45 They
prohibited the government from acting in a way that did violence to the apparent meaning
of statutory texts.46 This was a self-conscious method for limiting Fascist government, by
requiring genuine statutory authorization for its goals. By contrast, German judges
rejected formalism and construed statutes hospitably and in accordance with their
“purposes,” defined by reference to the public values of the Nazi regime.47 They thought
that courts could carry out their interpretive task “only if they do not remain glued to the
letter of the law, but rather penetrate its inner core in their interpretations and do their
part to see that the aims of the lawmaker are realized.”48 Thus, for example, the German
Supreme Court concluded that a law forbidding “sexual intercourse” between Germans
and Jews “is not limited to coition. . . . A broad interpretation is . . . appropriate in view
of the fact that the provisions of the law are meant to protect not only German blood but
43
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also German honor.” A lower court went so far as to conclude that kissing could take “the
place of normal sexual intercourse” and therefore violate the statute, in such a way as to
justify a two-year jail sentence.49
Of course we do not suggest that purposive interpretation is an ally of Fascism, or
that it is always illegitimate or unacceptable. Our only claim is that the evaluation of
purposive interpretation must depend, in large part, on an assessment of the relevant
institutions and of the effects of that approach over time. It is ludicrous to suggest that
purposive interpretation is best in the abstract, for the simple reason that no approach to
interpretation is best in the abstract. Here, as elsewhere, Hart and Sacks’ elaborate talk
about institutional competence is undercut by their stylized, nonempirical treatment of
actual institutions and their capacities.
Dworkin. Ronald Dworkin is often taken to be H.L.A. Hart’s antagonist, urging
an approach that Dworkin calls “integrity,” meant to be alternative to Hart’s form of
positivism.50 But on the issue that concerns us, Dworkin shares Hart’s blindness. On
Dworkin’s account, judges who seek “integrity” attempt to put existing legal materials in
“the best light possible.”51 They owe a duty of fidelity to those materials; but they are
also authorized to attempt to understand the materials by reference to what they see as the
most appealing principle that organizes them. “Law as integrity asks judges to assume, as
far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about
justice and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the
fresh cases that come before them, so that each person’s situation is fair and just
according to the same standards.”52 In arguing for this understanding of adjudication,
Dworkin offers not a word about the virtues and the imperfections of judges and the
systemic effects of one or another approach to interpretation.
Dworkin spends a great deal of time on Riggs v. Palmer,53 the famous case posing
the question whether judges should adopt a literal interpretation of the law of wills if the
consequence would be to allow a murderer to inherit from his victim.54 And Dworkin is
not wrong to argue that Riggs “was a dispute about what the law was, about what the real
statute the legislators enacted really said.”55 But it is inadequate to cast the issue in those
terms. The dispute was about the appropriate approach to statute whose literal text
produces absurdity. If courts ask about the meaning of “the real statute the legislators
enacted,” they will not be asking some of the crucial questions.
Dworkin does not say how he would decide Riggs, but he does offer a conclusion
about the appropriate resolution of TVA v. Hill. Dworkin supposes that his idealized
judge, Hercules, “shares the substantive opinion that seemed dominant on the [Supreme]
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Court, that the wiser course would be to sacrifice the fish to the dam.”56 If so, Dworkin
urges, it is “not difficult” to see how Hercules will vote, because he “thinks reading the
statute to save the dam would make it better from the point of view of sound policy.”
Given that judgment, Hercules will vote to allow the dam to be completed.
But to know how to vote in TVA v. Hill, is it really enough to consult “sound
policy”? Here Dworkin sounds very much like Hart, urging that statutory language
should not be taken to conflict with reasonable social purposes. Other things being equal,
the claim is surely correct. But it is important to ask whether Congress would overturn a
literal interpretation of the ESA, if the consequence was indeed to violate sound policy.
Subsequent events showed that Congress was entirely willing to do that.57 And it is also
important to ask about the systemic effects of a ruling that would allow the dam to be
completed. If that were the ruling, what would the ESA actually mean? Would
subsequent cases become hard too? If this question is in turn difficult to answer, then the
consequences of the ruling, in itself sensible, might in their way conflict with “sound
policy” as well. And in cases of this sort, do we have good reason to trust judges’ views
about sound policy? These points suggest that it is hardly enough to ask, as Dworkin
urges, which interpretation of the Endangered Species Act would best complete the story
that Congress has begun. If institutional considerations are taken into account, we might
conclude that judges should ask themselves a very different set of questions.
Where statutes are entirely ambiguous, it is impossible to decide cases simply by
reference to their words. But in TVA v. Hill, the words were far more easily taken to ban
the completion of the dam; and judicial unreliability, on conflicts between environmental
and economic goals, might well be taken to argue in favor of formalism.58 What is
striking about Dworkin’s analysis is that it is undertaken without any thought at all about
judicial capacities and about the effects, over time, of one or another approach to
interpretation. Like Hart, Dworkin proceeds as if the question is how an idealized judge
deals with interpretive problems—not how a real-world judge, operating as part of a
decisionmaking committee staffed by multiple actors, should proceed in the face of
uncertainty.
C. Contemporary Theory: Dynamism, Textualism, and Pragmatism
Contemporary interpretive theory is increasingly sophisticated along many
margins. Philosophy (including pragmatist antifoundationalism), linguistics, and
economics have all contributed to ever-more-refined normative accounts of
interpretation. Yet on the critical dimension of institutional awareness, many of the most
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prominent contemporary theorists do no better than their predecessors, or so we will
claim. Institutional blindness remains a pervasive condition in the current scene.
Eskridge. William Eskridge has a claim to being the most prominent interpretive
theorist of the modern era; his identification and critique of the “new textualism,”59 and
his advocacy of “dynamic interpretation,”60 redefined the field in the late 1980s. Yet a
neglect of institutional factors undercuts Eskridge’s conclusions just as it did his
predecessors’.61 Dynamic statutory interpretation, it turns out, embodies the nirvana
fallacy—the juxtaposition of an idealized picture of judicial capacities with a grudging
picture of the capacities of other actors in the interpretive system.
Eskridge’s principal target is the formalist approach that emphasizes the original
meaning of statutory text; his principal criticism is that this approach stumbles on the
problem of statutory obsolescence—statutes that have fallen out of step with the public
values prevailing in the surrounding context of the legal system. Dynamic interpretation
is the answer to the problem of obsolescence. Rather than adhering either to ordinary
meaning at the time of enactment, or even to legislative intent conceived in strictly
originalist terms, courts should “update” statutes by intelligent adaptation of original
purposes to new social circumstances, and by taking account of changes in the overall
fabric of public law.62 Yet Eskridge is sensitive to the radicalism of this recommendation,
which he moderates and improves by adding a side constraint: judges should treat
contemporary public values as something like an interpretive principle or canon,
defensible by clear contrary instructions from legislatures.63
At first glance this position is attractive, even compelling; how could “wooden”
or “mechanical” enforcement of obsolete statutes possibly be the best course of action for
judges to take? Eskridge’s claims certainly have some descriptive power, and on certain
assumptions, they might be plausible on institutional grounds as well. Yet Eskridge fails
to discuss those assumptions or those grounds. He does not consider how the case for
dynamic interpretation fares once we recognize the possibility that judges will make
serious mistakes in updating, or that the ex ante effects of dynamism on legislative
behavior might prove pernicious. We may agree with Eskridge that judicial updating is a
good thing, all else equal, but the proviso is crucial. The possibility of judicial mistakes,
or of deleterious system effects, makes Eskridge’s defense of dynamism radically
incomplete. Dynamic interpretation might or might not prove justified, given adequate
information on these variables; here as elsewhere we take no position on that ultimate
question. What is clear is that Eskridge has failed to ask, let alone answer, most of the
critical questions.
Start with the question of judicial error. The linchpin of dynamism is the claim
that “when societal conditions change in ways not anticipated by Congress and,
especially, when the legal and constitutional context of the statute decisively shifts as
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well, this current perspective should, and will, affect the statute’s interpretation.”64 This is
essentially a recommendation to minimize the false negative or Type II error: the
possibility that nondynamic approaches will erroneously fail to update obsolete statutes.
But Eskridge says very little about the converse possibility, the false positive or Type I
error: the risk that the judges’ relative social insulation, and the resulting informational
deficits, might cause them to err in the other direction, updating statutes that aren’t
obsolete because the judges fail to comprehend the statute’s current social utility. If
judicial updating produces erroneous rewriting of statutes whose sensible and fully up-todate justifications the judges have simply failed to understand, then dynamism may cause
more institutional failure than would a rule denying judges the authority to update. In any
case updating may cause harm if the new values, not yet able to receive clear democratic
support, are questionable on normative grounds. (Is it entirely irrelevant to mention that
Nazi judges were enthusiastic updaters?)
Eskridge also overlooks the possibility that the systemic effects of nondynamic
interpretive approaches would prove better, on Eskridge’s own criteria, than would the
systemic effects of dynamism. Eskridge supports his case for dynamism by drawing upon
process theory and public choice, arguing that “the legislature acting alone will be subject
to . . . biases,”65 and that “given the biases of the political process, the fact that judges are
not elected may enable them to be better ‘representatives’ of the people than their elected
legislators are (in some instances).”66 It may be true that interest-group pressure and
institutional failures will cause Congress to update statutes with insufficient frequency,
relative to some optimal rate of policy change. But that failure might itself be an
endogenous consequence of the interpretive theory the judges use. Textualists indeed
argue that their methods will spur legislatures to update at an optimal rate,67 and there is
certainly some evidence of updating in response to textualism.68 If so, then textualism
would itself just be the dynamic approach to interpretation that Eskridge advocates. On
certain empirical premises about institutional capacities, Eskridge ought to support the
very textualism that he spends so much time excoriating.
In later work Eskridge episodically shows an awareness of these considerations,
acknowledging, in the limited context of the legislative-history debate, that the
desirability of judicial resort to legislative history turns importantly on a cost-benefit
calculus that examines judicial performance, litigation costs, and legal certainty in
competing legislative-history regimes.69 Yet he also seems to think this sort of analysis
theoretically disreputable or empirically intractable or both. In even more recent work
Eskridge reverses his ground, arguing both that empiricism is conceptually meaningless
without normative premises (a question we address below) and that the relevant empirical
and institutional variables are costly to measure—certainly true, but hardly an argument
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for nonempirical interpretive theory.70 The sum of it is that, as with some of the other
theorists we will consider, Eskridge occasionally notes the critical institutional
considerations en passant, but fails to incorporate them into his normative account of
interpretation in any systematic way.
It is worth emphasizing that none of these considerations necessarily refutes
Eskridge’s dynamic conclusions. If judges update successfully more often than not, and if
textualist interpretation causes legislatures to spend most of their time correcting
mistaken (because wooden or mechanical) judicial interpretations, then textualism would
prove inferior to dynamic interpretation; Eskridge’s methods would push the courts
closer to the optimal rate of updating. But there is no valid path to that conclusion from
Eskridge’s institutionally insensitive premises.
Manning. Among contemporary writers, Eskridge’s chief formalist adversary is
John Manning, whose work details an important textualist account of interpretation
rooted in constitutional law, in contrast to Eskridge’s nontextualist dynamism. For our
purposes, however, the common ground between Eskridge and Manning is more
important than their differences. Strikingly, despite spirited debates between them,
Eskridge and Manning largely share the crucial and mistaken premise that the important
questions about interpretive theory are first-best questions, rather than second-best
questions about institutional performance and systemic effects.
Manning’s work shows that insufficient attention to institutional capacities is an
equal-opportunity hazard, one that afflicts nonformalists and formalists alike. Manning’s
contribution is to have provided the most rigorous attempt to justify formalist modes of
interpretation by reference to formal sources of law, principally the Constitution. In our
view, however, the project is an impossible one; it is doomed to failure despite
Manning’s skill at deductive reasoning from constitutional premises. Interpretive
formalism at the operational level—formalism in the jurisprudentially modest sense of
rule-bound interpretation that sticks close to the surface of statutory texts, where it is
possible to do so—cannot itself be justified by conceptual deduction from constitutional
premises. Supplemental institutional and empirical premises are needed, premises about
the comparative capacities of institutional actors and about formalism’s ex ante effects.
Consider Manning’s influential critique of judicial resort to legislative history.71
The argument suggests that the Constitution, particularly Article I’s procedure of
statutory enactment, should be read to embody an implicit norm against legislative selfdelegation. That constitutional norm forbids courts to afford “authoritative” weight to
legislative history in statutory interpretation, but allows consultation of legislative history
as a persuasive or confirmatory source.72 But this deduction, even if valid, leaves open
the most important questions about legislative history at the operative level, the level of
the interpretive doctrines that judges should use. Few people think that the legislative
history is “authoritative” in the sense that it trumps unambiguous text; the usual argument
is that the history is relevant to ascertaining meaning. That courts may not afford
70
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legislative history authoritative weight does not tell us whether courts should use
legislative history at all. That question, the crucial one, cannot be resolved through
Manning’s methods; its resolution depends on institutional issues. Manning’s position
forbids the judges to afford legislative history authoritative weight, but nothing in the
analysis suggests that the Constitution either requires or forbids the judges to consult
legislative history for its persuasive value. The judges presumably retain constitutional
discretion to use it, or to eschew its us, on other grounds. Whether they should do so is a
function of the consequences of the various alternative rules about legislative history that
the judges might adopt; those consequences will turn on institutional facts about judges’
capacities as interpreters of legislative history and the ex ante effects on legislative
drafting.
The general point here is that the formal constitutional premises that Manning
marshals, such as the textual separation of powers and its original understanding,
mandate neither formalist interpretive methods nor nonformalist interpretive methods.73
The Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say a great deal about the contested issues of
statutory interpretation; what it does say is often so minimal and so abstract as to leave
open all the reasonably contested questions of interpretive choice. Article I of the
Constitution, for example, specifies the conditions for the enactment of valid statutes,74
and the Supremacy Clause mandates that constitutionally valid statutes are supreme
law,75 so all major interpretive approaches agree that judges should respect the statutory
text. But no provision sets out explicit instructions to judges about what other sources or
considerations are admissible and relevant to help interpret the text. Nor do abstractions
like the separation of powers supply much in the way of concrete guidance. Textually,
provisions like the vesting clauses of Articles I and III separate legislative from judicial
power, but textualists, intentionalists, purposivists, and other schools can all validly claim
that their preferred method respects this weak constraint. At the level of express
commands, the Constitution simply does not choose sides in the competition between
first-best interpretive approaches that characterizes modern legal theory.
Furthermore, any supplemental instructions that can be elicited from the text, or
infused into it through structural and historical analysis, prove compatible with most
plausible positions on the contested problems of statutory interpretation. Consider the
recent debate between Manning and Eskridge over the original understanding of the
Article III “judicial Power.”76 Manning says that the grant of judicial power, understood
73
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both historically and in light of structural inferences from other provisions, bars
“equitable” interpretation of the Blackstonian sort, and thus commands federal courts to
follow a “faithful agent” account of interpretation.77 Eskridge says that the Blackstonian
appeal to statutes’ equity and spirit has a better historical pedigree than faithful-agent
approaches, and that courts interpreting equitably are helpful partners in the process of
lawmaking—and thus better agents, even on Manning’s own terms, than are courts
enslaved to a hierarchical vision of legislative supremacy.78 This is a fight that can end
only in stalemate. As for the history, there are respectable bits of originalist evidence on
both sides, and no agreed-upon originalist criterion or metaprocedure exists for
adjudicating between them. As for the structural inferences, constitutional premises about
equity, agency and legislative supremacy are pitched at too high a level of generality to
cut between competing views about, say, the interpretive value of committee reports, or
the absurd results canon.
The important point here is that the Manning/Eskridge debate rests on an
assumption, common to both parties, that the contest of interpretive theories must take
place on constitutional terrain. But the best reading of the Constitution is that interpretive
formalism and interpretive antiformalism are constitutionally optional for judges. On this
view, Manning’s project fails, not by virtue of any failure in execution, but by virtue of
its intrinsic limitations: the tools of constitutional formalism are too weak to produce
closure, by themselves, on the contested questions of interpretive doctrine. Those
questions require empirical and institutional analysis in addition to first-best theorizing
from constitutional premises.
Richard Posner. We conclude our catalogue with Judge Richard Posner, the
leading advocate of the view that consequences should matter to a theory of legal
interpretation. In his early writing, Posner endorsed an “imaginative-reconstruction”
approach to interpretation, asking judges to reconstruct the views of the enacting
legislature and to do what it would have done, had it been presented with the case at
hand.88 This approach, borrowed in part from Learned Hand,89 is an expanded version of
Blackstone’s idea that judges should make exceptions to overbroad statutes in “those
circumstances, which (had they been foreseen), the legislator himself would have
77
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excepted.”90 Like Blackstone’s approach, imaginative reconstruction is blind to
institutional considerations of the sort that we have been emphasizing throughout. That
the legislature, if informed of the application at hand, would have adopted a particular
statutory amendment does not mean that it would want the judges to do so on their own
initiative. And if judges frequently err in their counterfactual suppositions about what the
legislature would have done, then imaginative reconstruction may, even on its own terms,
push the judges even farther away from the legislature’s intentions than unimaginative
textualism would have.
More recently, Posner has endorsed a pragmatic account of adjudication
generally, one that subsumes a pragmatic account of statutory interpretation.91 The
pragmatic account should be fertile soil for the sort of institutional analysis needed in
interpretive theory. Pragmatism, as Posner uses the term, is a form of consequentialism,
hospitable territory for the approach urged here. Our theme is precisely that interpretive
rules can’t sensibly be chosen without consideration of institutional consequences. And
indeed Posner does recognize the possibility that the pragmatic judge might, on certain
empirical premises about the institutional capacities of judges and legislatures, decide
that interpretive formalism at the operational level would itself be the pragmatically best
course of action.
Yet this possibility remains, for Posner, an abstract and unappealing one. As soon
as possible he falls back upon a distinction between consequences for the “case at hand”
and the “systemic” consequences of decisions. On this view, the pragmatist maximand is
to do what is best in the case at hand, subject to a side-constraint: that case-specific
adjudication not produce unacceptable systemic costs in legal uncertainty and other
undesirable consequences: “The pragmatist thinks that what the judge is doing in
deciding the nonroutine case is trying to come up with the most reasonable result in the
circumstances, with due regard for such systemic constraints on the freewheeling
employment of ‘reason’ as the need to maintain continuity with previous decisions and
respect the limitations that the language and discernible purposes of constitutional and
statutory texts impose on the interpreter.”92 The point of all this is to preserve some
domain of policymaking discretion for judges, some field in which pragmatic judges can
run free, bringing their all-things-considered consequentialist judgments to bear on the
parties before them. Posner is quite candid about this: “[A]t their best American appellate
courts are councils of wise elders and it is not completely insane to entrust them with
responsibility for deciding cases in a way that will produce the best results in the
circumstances rather than just deciding cases in accordance with rules created by other
organs of government or in accordance with their own previous decisions, although that
is what they will be doing most of the time.”93
It should be apparent that this distinction between case-specific consequences and
systemic consequences, between the pragmatist maximand and the pragmatic sideconstraint, is illusory. The decision to license judges, in some domain, to interpret
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statutes so as to maximize beneficial consequences in the case at hand is itself a systemlevel choice of a particular kind, a choice that will have system-level effects on the
legislatures, agencies and litigants who must anticipate the judges’ efforts to sort cases
from one domain to the other. Depending on the values to be attached to the relevant
institutional variables, the legal uncertainty, including decision and litigation costs, that
the distinction creates might overwhelm the social benefits attainable in the class of cases
that Posner would leave to freewheeling judicial discretion. So the questions are systemic
all the way down, and Posner’s distinction collapses on itself.
If the distinction is illusory, it nonetheless has harmful effects. The very making
of the distinction has real and unfortunate consequences for Posner’s account of
adjudication generally and interpretation in particular. The insistence, amounting to a
faith, that there just has to be some domain of entirely carefree discretion left to the wise
elders of the bench94 causes Posner to take a one-sided view of the empirical and
institutional variables that a pragmatist would consider, if genuinely open-minded about
the possibility that interpretive formalism is pragmatically best for judges.
An example is Posner’s claim that American judges have no choice but to assume
the burdens of rulemaking and policymaking, because American legislatures (in contrast
to Parliament and continental legislatures) do not exercise sufficient oversight of the
statutory system, do not correct gaps and resolve ambiguities at a sufficient rate, and thus
leave the judges with no option but to amend statutes and fill statutory gaps through
interpretation.95 The institutional analysis here is radically incomplete and perhaps
mistaken. Posner offers no systematic analysis of the behavior of American legislatures;
he does not show that the legislative failure is as pervasive as he suggests that it is. But
suppose that he is right. Even if so, it might well be that the supposed irresponsibility of
American legislatures is at least in part the result, not (as Posner assumes) the cause, of
the relatively independent, policy-oriented approach to interpretation taken by American
courts. Perhaps American legislatures opt for ambiguity and passivity, to the extent that
they do, partly because the correctivist stance of American courts ensures that
underspecified or ill-considered legislation will in effect be supplemented or amended by
judicial decisions. To know which of these stories is true, we would have to know the
effects on legislatures of judicial formalism (or antiformalism); as a result we cannot rule
out formalism as a strategy for American courts. Posner’s claim that American judges
cannot be formalist turns out to rest not on evidence, but on intuition and an ungrounded,
and highly contestable, causal theory about the dynamic interaction of legislatures and
courts.
Our point is not that, when all of the relevant variables are considered, the
pragmatic judge should be an interpretive formalist. Our point is that Posner’s attempt to
treat systemic consequences as merely a side-constraint on interpretation, despite its
appearance of institutional sensitivity and hard-headedness, is just one more unsuccessful
attempt to wall off institutional considerations from interpretive theory. If this most
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consequentialist of theorists falls by the wayside, the problem of institutional insensitivity
is serious indeed.
II. First Best, Second Best, and Relevant Questions
Thus far we have criticized a wide range of theorists for their failure to engage
institutional issues. But there is an obvious objection to our emphasis on those issues. The
objection takes this form: Is it useful, or even possible, to evaluate institutional variables
without agreeing on a first-best theory? Without such a theory, we will be unable to know
what counts as interpretive error. For some textualists, adherence to the text is simply the
definition of a correct judgment; there is no independent measure of whether a judge has
blundered. It is easy to imagine an advocate of purposive interpretation, or of integrity,96
as offering the same claim. Perhaps a judge proceeds correctly if and only if she puts the
existing legal materials in the best constructive light. If this is so, what’s the point of an
institutional turn? Isn’t it rudderless, or useful only as an adjunct to the first-best account?
A. A Minimal Response
Our minimal response to these questions is that without institutional analysis,
first-best accounts cannot yield any sensible conclusions about interpretive rules. It is
impossible to derive interpretive rules directly from first-best principles, without
answering second-best questions about institutional performance. Consider an analogy. In
economics, the idea of second best demonstrates that if perfect efficiency cannot be
obtained, efficiency is not necessarily maximized by approximating the first-best
efficiency conditions as closely as possible; the second-best outcome might, in principle,
be obtained by departing from the first-best conditions in other respects as well.97 So too,
if an imperfect judge knows he will fall short of the standard of perfection defined by the
reigning first-best account of interpretation, it is by no means clear that he should attempt
to approximate or approach that standard as closely as possible.
Suppose, for example, that we believe that the meaning of a statute should in
principle be established by ascertaining the subjective intentions of those who enacted it.
It may nonetheless turn out that fallible judges ought not, simplemindedly, collect and
examine as much evidence of subjective intentions as they can find. If the text supplies
reliable evidence of intention, perhaps the best evidence, and if judges will mishandle
other types of evidence, such as legislative history, perhaps restricting judges solely to
the text will increase the likelihood that the judges will accurately ascertain the
legislators’ intentions.98 Or suppose we believe that an ideal interpreter would not allow
statutory texts to produce absurd results, results not possibly intended by a rational
legislator. From this it does not follow that the interpretive rules should license real
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judges to prevent unintended absurdity. If judges will often see absurdity when it isn’t
really present, simply because they misunderstand the substantive policies in play, then
allowing them to attempt to correct absurdity might do more harm than good; perhaps
they should not make that inquiry at all.
These examples illustrate that, at the very least, institutional analysis is necessary,
even if not sufficient, to an adequate evaluation of interpretive methods. It is of course
true, in these examples, that some first-best account is needed in order to define judicial
error. Our minimal point is that the first-best account, taken by itself, is necessarily
incomplete. It is impossible to derive interpretive rules directly from the first-best
account, because institutional considerations always intervene. An intentionalist account
of statutes’ authority, by itself, tells us nothing about whether real judges should consult
or not consult legislative history; a theoretical injunction to avoid absurd outcomes, by
itself, tell us nothing about whether real judges should be licensed to use an absurdresults doctrine. In any of these settings, certain findings about institutional capacities
might cause the proponent of the first-best account either to adopt or reject the
interpretive doctrine in question. Theory without institutional analysis spins its wheels,
unable to gain traction on the question of what interpretive rules real-world judges should
use.
B. Bypassing First-Best Disagreements? Incompletely Theorized Agreements on
Interpretive Practices
But we would go further. A second-best assessment of institutional issues might,
in some cases, be not only necessary but indeed sufficient to resolve conflicts over
interpretive theories, simply because the assessment might lead people with different
views on the theoretical issues to agree on the appropriate practices. For example,
intentionalists disagree sharply with textualists, at least about the right foundation for
interpretation. But they agree on a great deal, and most of the time, their disagreements
are quite irrelevant to their resolution of cases. Both agree that the statutory text is the
starting point for interpretation, and both accept the view that courts should not lightly
depart from the text, which most intentionalists see as strong evidence of intentions. On
the current Court, textualists are often able to join opinions written by intentionalists, and
vice versa.99 And given certain empirical and institutional assumptions both the
intentionalist and the textualist might even be able to agree upon a rule excluding
legislative history. The intentionalist would agree because, on particular empirical
premises, the rule would minimize both erroneous determinations of legislative intent and
the costs of litigation. The textualist would agree because, on the same premises, the rule
would minimize erroneous determinations of ordinary textual meaning and litigation
costs. This consensus would be in the nature of an incompletely theorized agreement:100
interpreters holding different theories of authority might, in this way, be enabled to
converge on particular doctrines.
There are many possible examples. In a legal system in which legislators
generally corrected absurd outcomes, and in which judicial use of the “absurd results”
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canon was abused to fit with judicial policy preferences, most people would be skeptical
of that canon. But if absurd outcomes are uncorrected in some domain, and if courts are
careful to apply the canon only in clear cases, what textualist should object101? Indeed,
institutional analysis might even enable interpreters to choose particular doctrines before,
or in place of, choosing a theory of authority. If, on certain empirical findings, it turned
out that legislative history should be excluded on any theory of the proper aims of
interpretation, then as far as that doctrinal question goes there would be no need to
choose a fundamental theory.
So it is uncontroversial that talk of judicial mistakes, and institutional analysis
generally, presupposes some underlying, first-best account of interpretation. But the point
doesn’t cut very deeply, nor does it contravene any of our claims. What modern
interpretive theory has largely overlooked is that institutional analysis is a necessary
condition for choosing interpretive rules, even if it is not a sufficient condition. And in
some domain, it may indeed be a sufficient condition. It is simply a logical blunder to
suppose that interpreters must agree upon some particular theory of authority in order to
agree upon interpretive doctrines. Where an overlapping consensus or incompletely
theorized agreement is possible, interpreters may choose rules while bracketing, and
remaining agnostic about, first-best accounts. Of course the scope or size of the domain
in which such agreement is possible remains uncertain. But that is just one more
empirical question for institutional analysis to answer.
C. Relevant Questions
Let us conclude this section by isolating the ingredients of that analysis, by
focusing on the issues, mostly empirical, that must be explored by those evaluating
formalism in various legal systems and various domains of law.
!

The first question, suggested above, is whether and when formalist decisions that
produce clear mistakes will be corrected by the legislature and whether the
corrections have low or high costs. Undoubtedly this question will have different
answers in different circumstances. We know far too little to know how to answer it
in the United States. Is the New York legislature, for example, different on this count
from the legislatures of California and Missouri? It would be highly desirable to
know much more about the interpretive practices of courts in different states, and to
make some evaluation of the different solutions. We might be able, for example, to
find state courts that are especially unwilling to make exceptions in cases of evident
absurdity—and we might be able to see whether courts of this kind have produced
outcomes that have remained legislatively uncorrected. We might also ask whether
legislatures are more, or less, likely to oversee and to fix judicial decisions that
attempt to follow statutory text.

!

A similar inquiry might proceed by comparing judicial and legislative behavior in
different domains of substantive law. Perhaps Congress is unlikely to police judicial
decisions interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act and the Sherman Act;
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perhaps Congress is entirely willing to oversee judicial decisions in the areas of tax
and bankruptcy. If so, different judicial approaches might be sensible in the different
areas. Where Congress is inattentive, and appears to rely on courts for long periods of
time, an irreverent judicial approach to statutory text might be defensible. Where
Congress will correct judicial errors fairly costlessly, formalism is easier to justify.
People with different first-best theories might well accept these suggestions. Does our
practice, in various domains, suggest that courts are less formal where Congress is
less attentive? It would be highly desirable to know. Here there is a large set of
empirical projects.
!

The second question is whether a nonformalist judiciary will greatly increase the
costs of decision, for courts, litigants, and those seeking legal advice. A large issue
here involves planning; if nonformal approaches make planning difficult or
impossible, there is a real problem.102 Some areas have a greater demand for planning
than others, and hence it might be predicted that courts will perceive themselves as
most constrained when planning is necessary. We might expect that the basic rules
governing disposition of estates will require a good deal of clarity, and that in view of
considerations of fair notice, many courts will be reluctant to interpret criminal
statutes flexibly to cover criminal defendants.103 Is this true? Are generalizations
possible about the circumstances in which nonformalism is especially unsettling?

!

The third question is whether a formalist or nonformalist judiciary, in one or another
domain, will produce mistakes and injustices. Of course people might dispute the
content of these categories. One person’s error might be another’s fidelity to law. But
the extent of social disagreement should not be overstated here. It is easy to imagine
cases in which courts have used background purposes, not to make sense of the law,
but to impose their own views about sound policy.104 We could know far more than
we now do about whether state or federal courts have done well or poorly when they
have consulted purposes, attempted to avoid absurdities, or invoked background
principles within the legal system. One empirical project would involve comparisons
among the courts of different states, to see if large differences can be found in
interpretive behavior. Another such project would involve comparisons over time, to
see if courts have changed from formalist to nonformalist approaches, or vice-versa,
and to see the antecedents and consequences of such shifts.

We do not suggest that these empirical projects would be simple to execute,105 or
that they would lead to uncontroversial normative recommendations. Our central claims
are that first-best theories are incomplete without an acknowledgement of the importance
of the questions just identified, and that it is not possible to deduce, from large claims
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about legitimacy or authority, an answer to the reasonably disputed questions of
interpretive choice. Precisely because the empirical study of interpretation remains in an
extremely primitive state, there is every reason to think that much will be gained by
further empirical efforts.
III. Implications
In the foregoing we have argued for something akin to an institutional turn in
interpretive theory. What reforms of statutory and constitutional interpretation would
such a turn counsel, if it were accomplished? What changes might it produce in public
law, if implemented? Here we will sketch, lightly, some possible implications of a
resolutely institutional approach to statutory interpretation by courts (Section A),
statutory interpretation by agencies (Section B), and constitutional interpretation by
courts (Section C). Our aim, as throughout, is not to defend any particular substantive
approach to interpretation, but to show how the institutional lens refocuses the relevant
questions.
A. Formalism and Empiricism
Implicit in much of Part II was the straightforward idea that interpretive
formalism might best be defended on empirical and institutional grounds. Here we will
amplify that idea by indicating the line of argument that such a defense would have to
take. We will focus on courts and legislatures, bracketing important questions about
agency interpretation and judicial interpretation in a world of agencies, questions taken
up in Section B.
A good beginning is to distinguish two senses of the protean word “formalism.”
In one sense, formalism refers to a type of justification for legal rulings or doctrines,
namely a conceptualistic or essentialist justification. For a large-scale example, consider
the Langdellian claim that law, properly so-called, must necessarily be organized by
deduction from self-evident first principles. For a small-scale example, consider the
Supreme Court’s occasional embrace of conceptualistic jurisprudence in constitutional
law, such as the essentialist distinction between “manufacturing” and “commerce,”106 or
between “legislative” and “executive” power.107
In a very different sense, explicated by Frederick Schauer among others,108
formalism refers to a particular decisionmaking strategy that courts might follow. Here
courts make a second-order decision109 to decide cases, where possible, according to rules
rather than standards, placing great emphasis upon the value of legal certainty and the
value of adhering to common understandings of constitutional and statutory commands.
On this account, a judicial preference for formalist decisionmaking need not and cannot
rest upon a deduction from any superior source of principles, such as the Constitution or
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some definition of law’s essence. Formalism is justified, if at all, by reference to a claim
that formalism will improve the legal system in relevant respects, with improvement
defined by reference to social goods exterior to law itself.
After the institutional turn, we will say, formalism in the second sense can be seen
as a potentially sensible decisionmaking strategy for courts interpreting statutes.
Formalism in this sense would counsel that courts stick close to the surface meaning of
texts, where possible, and place great emphasis on promoting, ex ante, the clarity of legal
commands and the intelligibility of the default rules against which legislatures must draft
statutes in the first instance. The formalist judge would generally decline to attempt to
mold statutes to fit their purposes or intentions, would hesitate to declare the apparent
import of statutory text “absurd,” and would narrow the range of outside sources
admissible to impeach textual meanings. It is no objection to formalism, so conceived, to
parrot the banality that texts are “clear” only by reference to the practices of some
linguistic community. That is certainly true, but it doesn’t mean that no text is clear.110 If
so, then courts might choose to be formalists, not by pretending that all texts are selfinterpreting in some context-free sense, but on good consequentialist grounds, thinking
that things will be better if courts emphasize the surface or apparent meaning of texts (as
constituted by relevant assumptions and practices), rather than impeaching them by
reference to other sources and considerations.
The significance of the institutional turn, on this view, is just to make clear that
formalism in the second, operational sense cannot itself be justified by formalism in the
first, justificatory sense. Formalism cannot be justified (or opposed) by an appeal to selfevident constitutional principles, by an appeal to the nature of democracy or lawmaking,
or by an appeal to a definition of law. Conversely, however, formalism as a
decisionmaking strategy in statutory interpretation, or for that matter in any other setting,
can be justified or opposed (solely) on the basis of a forward-looking assessment of the
consequences of the competing alternatives. Just as Manning errs by arguing for
formalism by reference to formal sources, so Eskridge errs by engaging Manning on the
same terrain in order to oppose formalism.111 The correct ground for opposing formalism
is that antiformalism will produce better consequences for public law than formalism
would.
Why might it be true (or false) that formalism in the second sense would be the
best interpretive method for courts to follow? What would we have to know, about the
consequences of the competing alternatives, to know whether courts should subscribe to
formalism? The variables are numerous, but can be herded into two large categories: the
performance of the interpreting judges, and the systemic effects of the judges’
interpretive rules on other actors. The former category subsumes the costs of mistaken
rulings, of Type I and Type II errors, and also the costs of decisionmaking itself. The
latter category subsumes a range of questions about the effect of the judiciary’s
interpretive rules on legislative drafting costs and the costs of administrative rulemaking,
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on citizens’ and agencies’ compliance with law, and on the behavior of other courts,
including both lower courts and future courts at the same level of the legal hierarchy.
A commitment to interpretive formalism, in the operational sense, would follow
from particular views about the values of these two (classes of) variables. On a dim
assessment of the performance of interpreting judges, for example, interpretive formalism
will appear more attractive than antiformalism. Relevant here are many questions about
the manageability of alternative interpretive sources, such as legislative history and
canons of construction, and about the limits of judicial information. A court interpreting
under tight constraints of time and information may do better to ignore or subordinate
interpretive sources, like legislative history, whose large volume and unfamiliar
components could often provoke judicial error. For similar reasons a court staffed by
generalist judges might do better, all else equal, by sticking to the apparent or common
meaning of texts, by and by eschewing empirically ambitious innovations in statutory
policy. A specialized court, by contrast, would often do better with antiformalist
interpretive techniques that give free play to the court’s superior appreciation of
legislative intentions, interest group deals, statutory policies, and social and economic
consequences. (In Section B we will argue, along the same lines, that specialist
administrative agencies might often wield nontextualist interpretive techniques more
successfully than generalist courts; specialized courts are an intermediate case).
So too, interpretive formalism will look more attractive on certain empirical
assumptions about feedback effects on legislative behavior, or system effects more
generally. Suppose that judicial formalism would produce more careful legislative
drafting, ex ante, and would encourage the development of corrective mechanisms, ex
post, such as the “Corrections Day” procedure recently instituted by the House of
Representatives.112 These possibilities are the ones overlooked by Posner in his claim that
the sloppiness of American legislatures requires American courts to adopt an
antiformalist stance.113 It is possible that the effects run in the other direction; to the
extent that they do, formalism should be preferred as the approach that will push the
interpretive system, taken as a whole, in desirable directions.
Law professors, who are usually highly specialized in some particular field or
other, often miss these points about the limited competence of generalist judges.114 It is
very common to see a law professor complaining that some generalist court has
blundered in its latest interpretation of the specialized statute that the professor has made
a career of studying; usually the blunder occurs because the court has, in the critic’s view,
interpreted “woodenly,” “mechanically,” or “formalistically,” with insufficient attention
to history, policy and nuance. In such cases there is a kind of selection bias in play. By
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interpreting woodenly, sticking close to apparent meaning, the court increases the risk of
one sort of error (the sort the critic castigates). But the court decreases the risk of another,
opposite sort of error—the error that an intellectually ambitious antiformalist court would
make by misreading statutory purposes, misidentifying sensible text as absurd, or
mispredicting the consequences of its rulings. Where courts are more often formalist than
not, the law professor rarely sees that kind of error and rarely complains about it.
There is a useful analogy to ethics here. The choice between interpretive
formalism and antiformalism has some of the same intellectual structure as the choice
between rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism. The rule-utilitarian will often be placed
in the awkward position of defending acts whose immediate effect is, when viewed in
isolation, socially detrimental. So too, it is the easiest thing in the world for law
professors to mention specific cases in which formalism produces blunders, relative to a
nuanced antiformalism that is sensitive to the particulars of cases. In both legal and
ethical settings, however, the second-order, rule-based decisionmaking strategies look
more appealing where the decisionmaker cannot be trusted to identify socially beneficial
acts, or appealing conceptions of statutory purpose.
Our emphasis on institutional considerations derives some support from
comparing interpretation in England with that in the United States.115 In England,
interpretation is far more rigid than in the United States. The British Parliament is less
likely to delegate discretionary authority to judges. For their part, English judges tend to
treat statutes as rules, generally refusing to investigate whether the particular application
of the rule makes sense as a matter of policy or principle. Institutional differences help
explain the situation. In England, drafting is done by an Office of Parliamentary Counsel,
a highly professional body with considerable experience in ensuring against inadvertent
mistakes. The Parliamentary Counsel attempts to promote a uniform style of drafting.
The Counsel is also closely attuned to the methods of English judges. The judges'
practice is itself uniform and relatively simple. Parliament revisits statutes with some
frequency, and it fixes mistakes that are shown as such when particular cases arise. 116
In the United States, by contrast, there is no centralized drafting body and hence
less uniformity in terminology. There is less professionalization in the production of
statutes. In America, the drafters of legislation are multiple and uncoordinated. Congress
appears only intermittently aware of the judges' interpretive practices, which are
themselves not easy to describe in light of the sheer size of the federal judiciary and the
existence of sharp splits, on just this point, within the Supreme Court. It would be wrong
to say that Congress is oblivious to judicial decisions interpreting statutes.117 But
Congress is not in the business of responding rapidly and regularly to particular cases in
which interpretations, literal or otherwise, tend to misfire. Hence both law-making and
law-interpreting practice are very different here than they are in England.
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This brief description connects well with the suggestion that the case for
formalism depends on institutional competence and on empirical matters. Roughly
speaking, the English lawmaking system displays active, professionalized legislative
oversight and a formalist judiciary, while the American lawmaking system is different on
both counts. None of this suggests that institutional capacities are somehow irrevocably
fixed in the two countries, or that American courts must necessarily adopt an
antiformalist stance. That is the mistaken view that Richard Posner advances; as we have
seen, his view overlooks that institutional capacities might themselves be affected by the
interpretive rules courts use, so that the adoption of a formalist stance by American courts
might spur American legislatures to increased activity. The important point is just that the
two legal systems are highly responsive to their own distinctive institutions. The debate
over interpretive formalism turns, most critically, on the structure of the lawmaking
system rather than on claims about the nature of communication, democracy, or
jurisprudential principles.
B. Agencies and Courts
The Chevron question. How should courts approach agency interpretations of
law? Should courts decide legal questions on their own, or should they give some weight
to the views of the relevant agency? For many years the answer to this question was
sharply disputed. It received an authoritative answer in Chevron v. NRDC,118 which sets
out a two-step inquiry. Under step one, the question is whether Congress has “directly
decided the precise question at issue,” or whether Congress has unambiguously banned
what the agency proposes to do.119 Under step two, courts ask whether the agency’s
interpretation of the statute is reasonable.120 The result is that under Chevron, agency
interpretations of law should be upheld if they are reasonable and if they do not
contradict the clear instructions of Congress. The court is not authorized to reject the
agency’s interpretation merely because of disagreement.
How is Chevron to be evaluated? It is generally agreed that courts must follow
congressional instructions on the question of deference--that if Congress has
unambiguously instructed courts to defer to agency interpretations of law, or not to do so,
courts must do as Congress says.121 With this premise, many people have defended
Chevron, or challenged Chevron, by reference to enacted law. Some urge, for example,
that the Administrative Procedure Act, which asks courts to “decide relevant questions of
law,” argues in favor of an independent judicial judgment on the legal question. But on
reflection, statutory law is generally indeterminate on the crucial question. To be sure,
courts are told to decide relevant questions of law; but under statutes in which agencies
are exercising delegated authority, perhaps the meaning of the relevant law is what
agencies say that it is. At the very least, this is a plausible reading of statutes that delegate
rulemaking and adjudicative authority to agencies. Plausible, but not necessary; candid
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observers, on all sides, acknowledge that Congress has not authoritatively required or
forbidden the Chevron principle.122
We think that the best defenses of Chevron attempt to read ambiguous
congressional instructions in a way that is well-attuned to institutional considerations. As
the simplest illustration, consider Peter Strauss’ defense of Chevron.123 Strauss
emphasizes that the Supreme Court is able to resolve a small percentage of cases
involving ambiguities in regulatory law. He suggests that because of the sheer number of
courts of appeals, independent judicial interpretations of regulatory law would make it
extremely difficult to ensure national uniformity. If Chevron is followed faithfully,
agency interpretations will be authoritative unless there has been clear error; and this
means that if the EPA, the FCC, or the NLRB interprets its governing statute in a
particular way, national law is likely to be genuinely national. If Chevron were not the
law, and were not followed faithfully, it is inevitable that regulatory law—involving, for
example, the environment, communications, and labor-management relations—will be
highly variable across the country. Chevron therefore works against balkanization of
federal law.
This consideration need not be decisive. But other institutional points are relevant.
The resolution of statutory ambiguities must, in many cases, depend on judgments of fact
and value. Does the word “source,” as used in the Clean Air Act, refer to particular
smoke stacks, or to plants? Does the word “harm,” as used in the Endangered Species
Act, refer to intentional or reckless killings, or destruction of habitat as well?124 It is
reasonable to think that by virtue of their specialized competence and relative
accountability, agencies are in a better position to make these decisions than courts.
In making this suggestion, we mean to draw attention to two ways of analyzing
the Chevron problem. The first, and perhaps the most common, is to speak in terms of
constitutional considerations, separation of powers, and congressional instructions. We
agree that if any of these were clear, the question would be at an end. But here, as in
many other contexts, the relevant sources of law do not resolve the choice of interpretive
choice. The second way of analyzing Chevron is frankly institutional. Our submission
here is that the institutional arguments, however they might be resolved, are the best way
to think about the problem. And this submission has broader implications. For example, it
raises the possibility that the Mead decision,125 depriving interpretive rules of Chevron
deference, might be wrong, simply because the institutional variables call for deference to
interpretive rules too.
A simple submission. Now let us link two parts of the discussion thus far.
Suppose we conclude that for many American courts, much of the time, some form of
textualism is the best approach to statutory interpretation. Suppose that we also conclude
that Chevron is correct. Must agencies be textualists? This question has no clear answer
under current law. We urge here that attention to institutional considerations can show
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why agencies might be given the authority to abandon textualism even if courts should be
denied that authority.
Two points are relevant here. First, agencies are likely to be in a better position to
decide whether departures from the text actually makes sense. This is so mostly because
agencies have a superior degree of technical competence; but it is not irrelevant that
agencies are subject to a degree of democratic supervision. Second, agencies are likely to
be in a better position to know whether departures from the text will seriously diminish
predictability or otherwise unsettle the statutory scheme. If agencies are not concerned
about the risk of unsettlement, there is some reason to think that the risk is low. Our
suggestion is that because of these points, the case for formalistic interpretation from
judges might well be stronger than the case for formalistic interpretation by agencies.
In fact a number of decisions seem to show an implicit agreement with this point.
The leading case is American Water Works v. EPA.126 The case involved a creative
approach, by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to the regulation of lead in
drinking water. The Safe Drinking Water Act requires the EPA to produce maximum
contaminant level goals (MCLG) for water contaminants.127 These goals must “be set at
the level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons
occur,” with an adequate margin of safety.128 The EPA’s MCLG for lead was zero,
because no safe threshold had been established. Once an MCLG is established, EPA is
required to set a maximum contaminant level (MCL), “as close to the maximum
contaminant level goal as is feasible.”129 The EPA is authorized not to set a maximum
contaminant level, and to require “the use of a treatment technique in lieu of establishing”
that level, if (and only if) it finds “that it is not economically or technologically feasible
to ascertain the level of the contaminant.”130
For lead, then, the EPA would be expected to set its MCL as close as “feasible”
(economically and technologically) to the MCLG of zero, except if it was not “feasible”
to ascertain the level of lead contamination (and no one urged that the task of
ascertainment was not feasible). But this is not what EPA did, because of some
distinctive features of the lead problem. Source water is basically lead-free; the real
problem comes from corrosion of service lines and plumbing materials. With this point in
mind, EPA refused to set any MCL for lead. The EPA reasoned that an MCL would
require public water systems to use extremely aggressive corrosion control techniques,
which, while economically and technologically “feasible,” would be counterproductive,
because they would increase the level of other contaminants in the water. What appeared
to be the legally mandated solution would make the water less safe, not more so. The
EPA therefore chose a more subtle and modest approach. Instead of issuing an MCL, it
required all large water systems to institute certain corrosion control treatment, and
required smaller systems to do so if and only if representative sampling found significant
lead contamination.
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The EPA did not contend that an MCL was not “feasible” to implement, nor did it
argue that it was not “feasible,” in the economic or technological sense, to monitor lead
levels in water. Nonetheless, the court upheld the agency’s decision.131 The court
accepted the EPA’s seemingly implausible suggestion that the word “feasible” could be
construed to mean “capable of being accomplished in a manner consistent with the Act.”
The court said that “case law is replete with examples of statutes the ordinary meaning of
which is not necessarily what the Congress intended,” and it added, pointedly and
controversially, that “where a literal meaning of a statutory term would lead to absurd
results,” that term “has no plain meaning.”132 Because an MCL would itself lead to more
contamination, “it could lead to a result squarely at odds with the purpose of the Safe
Drinking Water Act.”133
The court therefore accepted EPA’s view “that requiring public water systems to
design and implement custom corrosion control plans for lead will result in optimal
treatment of drinking water overall, i.e. treatment that deals adequately with lead without
causing public water systems to violate drinking water regulations for other
contaminants.”134 It should be plain that the court permitted a quite surprising and even
countertextual interpretation of the Act. The statutory terms seem to make no room for
the EPA’s refusal to issue an MCL. In upholding the EPA’s refusal, the court authorized
the agency to avoid an unreasonable result.
Qualifications. We believe that agencies should not be required to interpret
statutes in the same way as courts; but any judgment on this point itself depends on
contextual factors. If, for example, Congress would immediately and costlessly correct
the problems that would be produced by formalism, then there would be much less need
to allow interpretations of the kind upheld in American Water Works. In a legal universe
in which Congress can be expected to correct the problem in that case—if it is indeed a
problem—the pressure for agency correction would be greatly reduced. And there are
other possible problems. Suppose that, in a world not so very different from our own,
agencies are systematically distrusted, in part because they are not technically expert after
all, in part because they are highly susceptible to the power of self-interested private
groups, moving their decisions in predictable directions. In such a world, the argument
for purposive agency interpretation, in the face of statutory text, would be very weak.
And in fact it is not difficult to imagine a legal system in which courts are, and should be,
authorized to engage in purposive interpretation, and in which agencies must follow the
text unless courts specifically instruct them not to do so.
With these points we are able to have a better understanding of some continuing
disputes about judicial review of agency action. Notwithstanding American Water Works
and similar decisions, a number of cases insist that agencies adhere closely to statutory
text. If these outcomes are to be defended, it must be with an expectation that Congress
will correct the resulting problems, or with a belief that agencies, authorized to depart
from text, will move regulatory law in undesirable directions.
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Another contextual and empirical factor to consider is whether a regime of
purposive interpretation by agencies and textualist interpretation by courts would be
stable. We might imagine, pessimistically, that the anticipation of judicial review by
textualist courts would cause agencies to adopt textualist methods, simply to maximize
the chances of having their decisions sustained; agencies’ authority to depart from
textualism would then become strictly nominal. If so, it would provide a reason, all else
equal, for courts and agencies to adopt the same interpretive approach, although we
would still face the important choice between across-the-board textualism or across-theboard purposivism. But we might also imagine, more optimistically, that reviewing courts
defer to agencies’ adoption of a purposive interpretive style, even if the same courts
would adopt a textualist approach when deciding cases with no agency in the picture.
Chevron, after all, can easily be understood to allow the agency some latitude to choose
between interpretive approaches, and to vary from the approach the court itself would
adopt. In this scenario, the agency would have no need to mimic the judges’ own
interpretive approach, so a regime of agency purposivism and judicial textualism would
not be excessively unstable. These possibilities, like the considerations above, exemplify
the sort of institutional questions that a fully-developed analysis of agency interpretation
must ask.
Arbitrariness and ossification: a final note on administrative law. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, courts are required to set aside agency action that is
“arbitrary” or “capricious.” But what do these terms mean? How should courts try to
answer that question? For much of the modern period of administrative law, the answer
has come from accounts of “agency failure.” Drawing attention to administrative
susceptibility to powerful private groups, many critics, both on and off the federal bench,
have endorsed the idea that courts should take a “hard look” at agency action, in order to
reduce factional influences and promote better policymaking.
What has been ignored, for much of the life of the resulting debate, are two sets of
risks. The first involves judicial error, partly a product of sheer ignorance.135 The second
and more fundamental involves systemic effects, above all in the form of large-scale
alterations in administrative behavior, produced by the very fact of “hard look” review. It
is now well-documented that such review has contributed to the “ossification” of noticeand-comment rulemaking, which now takes years, in part as a result of the effort to fend
off judicial challenges. In light of the risk of invalidation, many agencies have turned
away from notice-and-comment rulemaking altogether—with NHTSA, for example,
attempting to promote automobile safety, for example, through ex post recalls, which is
generally regarding as a senseless way to proceed. Our claim here is that the analysis of
hard look review is ludicrously incomplete if it does not pay attention to institutional
considerations of this kind. And indeed, much of the most impressive current work in
administrative law attempts to incorporate judicial fallibility, and dynamic effects, into an
account of how to assess whether agency action counts as “arbitrary” under the APA.136
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C. Constitutional Interpretation
Overview. Our principal recommendation has been that interpretive theory in
legislation and administrative law should take an institutional turn. What of constitutional
interpretation? Here we will say that academic theory about constitutional law does far
better, on the score of institutional sensitivity, than academic theory about statutory
interpretation. Constitutional theorists have, in part, already taken the institutional turn,
with important work beginning in the 1970s. At the same time, the turn is as yet
incomplete and has not been explicitly recognized as such; the treatment of basic
questions in constitutional law, such as judicial review, has always suffered from
institutional blindness, and there remain important pockets of contemporary theory that
are resolutely oblivious to second-best questions.
We will begin by emphasizing the extent to which the foundations of interpretive
theory in constitutional law are deficient on the score of institutional sensitivity. Here the
critical case is, of course, Marbury v. Madison137 and its inadequate (because excessively
abstract and conceptual) justification for judicial review. After sketching the partial and
salutary turn to institutional analysis in modern constitutional theory, and especially in
the most recent work, we then discuss several important theorists who exemplify the
remaining, unreconstructed resistance to institutional analysis: Ronald Dworkin, Akhil
Amar, and Lawrence Lessig. We mean to press claims that parallel our claims about
statutory interpretation. First, at a minimum, accounts of constitutional interpretation are
incomplete without reference to institutional capacities. Second, and more ambitiously,
institutional considerations may enable constitutional lawyers to converge upon
interpretive approaches, while bracketing first-best accounts of constitutionalism or
simply remaining agnostic about them.
Marbury v. Madison. Is judicial review desirable? Does the Constitution call for
it? These are old and much-debated questions. Our modest goal here is to do draw
attention to a serious problem: Many of the most well-known arguments on behalf of
judicial review, including those in Marbury itself, are blind to institutional
considerations. They ignore the risk of judicial error and the possibility of dynamic
consequences. In American law, Chief Justice John Marshall might even be deemed the
father, or the founder, of the kind of institutional blindness that we are criticizing.
Indeed, what is most striking about Marshall’s arguments for judicial review is
that they depend on a series of fragile textual and structural inferences, ignoring the
institutional issues at stake. Much of Marshall’s emphasis is on the unobjectionable claim
that the constitution is “superior paramount law”; but it is possible to accept that claim
without also thinking that courts are authorized to strike down statutes that violate that
law. A constitution is “superior paramount law” in many legal systems that offer little or
no judicial review of legislation. When Marshall famously asserts that “[it] is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”138
he is offering a conclusion, not an argument on its behalf. Marshall invokes the
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Supremacy Clause,139 which certainly mean that a law repugnant to the Constitution must
yield; but that clause offers nothing in support of the institutional claim that courts have
the power to strike down laws that, in their judgment, are unconstitutional. Marshall’s
textual and structural inferences are very weak, and no source of constitutional meaning
clearly settles the question. Any evaluation of Marshall’s conclusion must depend, in
large part, on institutional considerations.
If it appears odd to suggest that judicial review need not be a part of the American
constitutional fabric, a reading of the historical materials should dispel the appearance.140
Larry Kramer urges that for the framers, the "Constitution was not ordinary law, not
peculiarly the stuff of courts and judges." Instead it was "a special form of popular law,
law made by the people to bind their governors."141 For many members of the
revolutionary generation, constitutional principles were subject to "popular
enforcement,"142 that is, public insistence on compliance with the Constitution, rather
than judicial activity. "It was the legislature's delegated responsibility to decide whether a
proposed law was constitutionally authorized, subject to oversight by the people. Court
simply had nothing to do with it, and they were acting as interlopers if they tried to
second-guess the legislature's decision."143 Kramer traces the controversial early growth
of the practice of judicial review, with many seeing it as an "act of resistance." At the
founding, a "handful of participants saw a role for judicial review, though few of these
imagined it as a powerful or important device, and none seemed anxious to emphasize it.
Others were opposed . . . . The vast majority of participants were still thinking in terms of
popular constitutionalism and so focused on traditional political means of enforcing the
new charter; the notion of judicial review simply never crossed their minds."144
In Kramer's account, constitutional limits would be enforced not through courts,
but as a result of republican institutions and the citizenry's own commitment to its
founding document. Kramer raises serious doubts about the understanding in Marbury v.
Madison and in particular about judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the
Constitution. He suggests that for some of the framers, judicial review was "a substitute
for popular resistance" and to be used "only when the unconstitutionality of a law was
clear beyond dispute."145 What is important for our purposes is the idea that at the
American founding, the supremacy of the Constitution was clear, but judicial
enforcement was not, in part because of ambivalence about which institutions would be
well-suited to ensuring compliance.
Of course judicial review is, at present, constitutionally respectable to say the
least; we do not mean to argue against it here. But it is easy to imagine constitutional
systems that would refuse to give judges the power to strike down legislation. If judges
are corrupt, biased, poorly-informed, or otherwise unreliable, it would hardly make sense
to entrust judges with that power. And if legislative officials could be trusted to be
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faithful to constitutional commands, the need for judicial review would be greatly
diminished. Or suppose that a constitutional system feared, with reason, that the power of
judicial review would weaken the attention paid by other institutions to constitutional
requirements—so that judicial review, it was thought, would weaken the grip of
constitutional limitations on other branches. This conjecture, empirical in character, has
been made in the United States as elsewhere.146 A system of this kind might be accepted
by people who believe emphatically in constitutionalism, but who think that judicial
review will tend to undermine rather than to promote its goals. Hence the analysis of the
Marbury question itself must depend, in part, on the same considerations that we have
been stressing throughout.
It is possible to draw a general conclusion. In many domains, the question is
posed whether one institution should review the acts of another, and if so, the intensity
with which that review should occur. This question arises, for example, in the context of
constitutional challenges; attacks on criminal convictions; review of punitive damage
awards by juries; appellate review of trial court findings; and judicial review of agency
decisions of law, fact, and policy. In all of these areas, it is important to pay close
attention to institutional variables. The costs of error and the costs of decision are crucial.
It is necessary to examine dynamic effects. There is no sensible acontextual position on
the question whether review, of one institution or another, should be intense or
deferential, or indeed available at all.
Modern constitutional theory. We do not mean to claim that Marbury’s
institutional blindness fairly represents all of subsequent constitutional theory in
America. Many important strands of post-Marbury theory have been grounded in
accounts of institutional capacities. Most familiar is Thayer’s idea that the Constitution
might properly be treated, or interpreted, in one way by a legislature and another way by
a court, in light of the distinctive characteristics of the interpreting institution. Among the
modern refinements of this idea are Alexander Bickel’s legal process account of the
distinctive attributes of courts as constitutional interpreters, although that account
glorified courts’ insulation (“the ways of the scholar”) while overlooking the
informational deficits that insulation produces;147 and Lawrence Sager’s idea that
legislatures might properly be charged with responsibility for underenforced
constitutional norms. In general, it is unsurprising that a body of theory pervasively
structured around the countermajoritarian difficulty should display some sensitivity to
institutional role, if only in the stylized, abstract manner of the legal process tradition. In
this light, it is perhaps most accurate to say that constitutional theory has always taken
some account of the institutional determinants of interpretation.
Indeed, new contributions, of the 1990s and after, have displayed an increasingly
sophisticated treatment of institutional attributes and capacities. First, lawyer-economists
like Neil Komesar148 and Einer Elhauge149 drew upon transaction-cost economics and
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interest-group theory to refute simple arguments for an aggressive judicial posture in
constitutional cases—what Komesar calls “single-institutional” arguments that fail to
compare all relevant costs and benefits of the available institutional alternatives.150
Consider the standard line that judges should intervene to correct failures in political
markets. Formulated in a traditional legal process vocabulary by John Hart Ely, this view
was translated into the vocabulary of public choice by libertarians and free-marketers in
the 1980s. Komesar and Elhauge, however, make clear that process failures in the form
of rent-seeking activity and differential interest-group access afflict the courts as well
(Elhauge), and that whatever relative insulation judges enjoy comes at the price of severe
informational deficits (Komesar), so that the judges are prone to stumble into empirical
pitfalls. The premise of comparative judicial advantage underlying the standard line, then,
is at best questionable, and defending that line has become far more complicated
business.151
A second, currently influential strand in recent constitutional theory might be
called neo-Thayerian; it is represented by Jeremy Waldron,152 Mark Tushnet,153 and
Larry Kramer,154 among others. Waldron has examined how legislative institutions help
to resolve otherwise intractable political disagreements; Tushnet has revived and enriched
the Thayerian concern with the debilitating effects of judicial guardianship on legislative
performance; and Kramer, as we have seen, has worked to dispel overheated claims on
behalf of ambitious, interventionist judicial review, especially by impeaching its
historical pedigree. In general, the stylized abstractions about legislative and judicial
capacities familiar to legal process have been improved by successive doses of realism
and analytic sophistication, especially by the neo-Thayerians on the legislative side and
by the lawyer-economists on the judicial side—although both camps have enriched our
understanding across the whole institutional system, as is fitting for approaches that
emphasize comparative institutional analysis and the avoidance of nirvana fallacies.
These strands of recent constitutional theory might be described as involving
institutional competence writ large; their focus is on the large-scale allocation of
responsibility, for policymaking and lawmaking, between or among the courts and
political branches. To these salutary developments we wish to add considerations of
institutional competence writ small. To the extent that interpretive authority over certain
questions has been allocated to the courts by some background theory of comparative
competence, there remains the question what interpretive rules courts should use in
constitutional cases. We will claim that important strands of constitutional theory still
attempt to answer this last question in an institutional vacuum. The essential defect in
these accounts is that they are entirely insensitive to the identity and capacities of the
interpreter; they treat the interpreter, explicitly or implicitly, as a theorist much like the
constitutional theorist himself, rather than a judicial bureaucrat deciding cases under
constraints of time, information and expertise. We will consider three examples: the
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interpretive accounts of Ronald Dworkin, Akhil Amar, and Lawrence Lessig. In
important respects these theorists perpetuate, even amplify, the flaws in Marbury’s logic.
Dworkin (redux), and a philosophical brief. Dworkin’s approach to constitutional
law is nicely illuminated by an unusual brief submitted to the Supreme Court in the
assisted suicide cases, a document widely known as “The Philosophers’ Brief.” 155 The
brief bears Dworkin’s distinctive mark, and indeed Dworkin is listed as lead counsel. The
Philosophers’ Brief offers an ambitious argument, one with considerable appeal. It says
that some “deeply personal decisions pose controversial questions about how and why
human life has value.156 In a free society, individuals must be allowed to make those
decisions for themselves, out of their own faith, conscience, and convictions.” The brief
urges that distinctions between “omissions” (failing to provide continued treatment) and
“acts” (providing drugs that will produce death) are “based on a misunderstanding of the
pertinent moral principles.” Drawing on the abortion cases, the brief says that every
person “has a right to make the ‘most intimate and personal decisions central to person
dignity and autonomy,’” a right that encompasses “some control over the time and
manner of one’s death.”157 The brief thus urges the Court to declare a constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide. Dworkin’s personal gloss on the brief says that it “defines a
very general moral and constitutional principle--that every competent person has the right
to make momentous personal decisions, which invoke fundamental religious or
philosophical convictions about life’s value for himself.”158
Simply as a matter of political morality, the argument in the Philosopher’s Brief is
certainly reasonable, and it cannot easily be shown to be wrong. But suppose that the
Court was convinced by the argument in principle; should the Court have held that there
is a right to physician-assisted suicide? This is not so clear. Before accepting the
argument, it is necessary to ask about judicial competence to evaluate moral arguments of
this sort, and also to ask facts and incentives. Perhaps the Court is not especially wellequipped to evaluate those arguments; and if consequences matter, the moral arguments
might not be decisive in light of the risk that any right to physician-assisted suicide
would, in practice, undermine rather than promote the autonomy of patients.159
Many people, including Dworkin himself, appear to think that the Supreme Court
should not much hesitate to find a constitutional right of some kind if it is presented with
convincing (to the judges) philosophical arguments for that right, at least if the right
“fits” with the rest of the legal fabric. For those who take an institutional perspective, this
view is wrong. Courts may not understand what justice requires, or may not be good at
producing justice even when they understand it. In these circumstances, their
understanding of the Constitution is partly a product of their judgments about their own
distinctive role as a social institution. Note that this claim does not depend on skepticism
about moral or political arguments. It is reasonable to believe that judges are not wellequipped to engage in theoretically ambitious tasks, without also believing that political
theory is itself problematic or useless.
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Amar. Akhil Amar describes his preferred interpretive approach as
“intratextualism.”160 The term denotes a textualism that makes extensive use of
comparisons across clauses, even to the point of insisting that words appearing in widely
separated contexts be given similar meanings—a technique capable of generating
dramatic readings, such as the claim that the key to understanding the meaning of
“speech” in the First Amendment is the meaning of “speech” in the Speech and Debate
Clause. Amar’s target is what he calls “clause-bound” interpretation, the judicial practice
of reading constitutional provisions and their accompanying history and precedent in
(partial) isolation from textually related provisions.
In its emphasis on the authority of constitutional text, and in its populist
underpinnings, Amar’s account appears to lie at some polar opposite from Dworkin’s, in
which the constitutional text does relatively little work and populism is hardly a defining
ideal. Yet for our purposes the two accounts are on a par. What Dworkin and Amar share
is a deep commitment to a sort of constitutional holism: a commitment to reading the
Constitution (whether that is taken to denote the document’s text or the moral principles
underlying constitutional law) as a coherent, integrated whole. It is this shared feature of
holism or coherentism that unites our critique of Dworkin with our critique of Amar.
Amar, like Dworkin, ignores the possibility that real-world judges charged with holistic
interpretation will simply blunder, producing a pattern of incoherent outcomes, or, worse
yet, producing an internally coherent but morally misguided vision of public law.161
Amar recommends intratextualism as tool suitable to the courtroom as well as the
classroom; indeed most of Amar’s intratextualist heroes are famous judges, especially
John Marshall. Yet Amar pays no attention to the institutional capacities of the real-world
judges who would be charged with practicing intratextualism; he ignores the judges’
interpretive capacities or their likely performance under the alternative regimes of
intratextualism, on one hand, and clause-bound interpretation, on the other. Compared to
the clause-bound alternative, intratextualism requires a more complicated and
information-intensive inquiry, one that will reduce decisional accuracy whenever judges
read the comparison texts mistakenly. So, for example, a judge who looks to the Speech
and Debate Clause to illuminate the Free Speech Clause might well go badly wrong,
given that the former provision predated the First Amendment and addresses very
different problems. Amar gives us no reason to think that the illuminating effect of
intratexualism will predominate over its error-producing effect.
What’s worse, intratextualism in the hands of fallible judges risks producing a
holistic, highly coherent, but fundamentally mistaken analysis, one that constitutionalizes
a simultaneous misreading of a whole set of related provisions. Justice Douglas’ opinion
in Griswold v. Connecticut,162 for example, offered a holistic, coherent account of the
Bill of Rights as based upon a general principle of privacy; and it is an account that Amar
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himself thinks is deeply mistaken.163 If Amar had a more realistic view of judges’
abilities as constitutional interpreters, he might prefer the limited incoherence of clausebound interpretation to a sweeping, integrated, but erroneous universal account. What
Amar has done, in short, is to overlook the principle of second-best. Rather than asking
“What interpretive methods should judges use?,” Amar has asked “What interpretive
methods would I use, were I a judge?”—the question that, as we have seen, is a common
cause of institutional blindness in interpretive theory.
Lessig, Interpretation as Translation, and Compensating Adjustments. Similar
problems beset Lawrence Lessig’s account of constitutional interpretation, which sees
that practice as an exercise in “translation.”164 Translation is a particular version of
originalism, of “fidelity” to the Constitution of the founding era. Lessig’s important
insight is that judges might, in principle, act more faithfully to the original constitution by
updating constitutional rules to meet changed circumstances than by adhering woodenly
to the specific text chosen by the founding generation, or to their specific expectations.
Just as a translator might do better to choose a colloquial analogue that captures the
flavor of the original, rather than simply using a literal equivalent, so too the original
meaning of the constitutional structure might, in changed circumstances, best be
preserved by departures from the original understanding. In the area of federalism, for
example, Lessig urges the Court to “make up” constitutional rules that restore the original
balance between federal and state authority.165 “[T]o be faithful to the constitutional
structure, the Court must be willing to be unfaithful to the constitutional text.”166
Translation is, without doubt, a valuable contribution to first-best theorizing about
constitutional interpretation. No other such account has, in recent years, generated as
much comment and as many engaging applications.167 Translation is best viewed as a
refinement of purposivism: like Hart and Sacks’ approach, translation boosts the level of
interpretive generality from the specific intentions or expectations of a law’s framers to
their ultimate aims or ends. But Lessig’s account also shares purposivism’s insensitivity
to institutional considerations. Lessig fails to consider the possibility that judges might be
poor translators, garbling meanings so badly that a simple-minded transliteration would
preserve more of the original than would an ambitious and mistaken attempt to capture
the original’s real sense. Judicial mistakes might make ambitious attempts at translation
self-defeating, driving results further away from the original meaning rather than pushing
results closer to it. In the federalism setting, for example, it is by no means obvious that
making up rules to approximate the original balance is, even on Lessig’s theoretical
premises, the right prescription for the Court. The Court might overshoot the mark by
announcing stringent restrictions on federal authority that push constitutional law farther
away from the founding balance than would deference to national political processes.168
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Here is another example, taken not from Lessig’s own work but from the
secondary literature applying Lessig’s insights.169 Suppose that the original Constitution,
rightly understood, bars delegations of legislative authority to the executive, and also bars
the legislative veto. (Of course we do not mean to endorse or oppose either claim here).
The circumstances of modern government are such, however, that delegations of
legislative authority are pervasive, and there is no prospect of returning to the original
understanding in this regard. The translation theorist might argue that judges should vote
to uphold the legislative veto, even though it is clearly unconstitutional in isolation, on
the ground that it is a “compensating adjustment”170 needed to restore the original
structural balance among the branches of government.171 The legislative veto will, on this
view, allow the legislature to limit and police the sweeping delegations of authority that it
cannot avoid making. In fact Justice White’s dissent in the decision that invalidated the
legislative veto urged upholding the veto on just this ground.172
Of course there is a competing account. Perhaps the legislative veto falls afoul of
the translated Constitution, because it aggravates the power of self-interested private
groups over processes of lawmaking, thus defeating the goal of bicameralism and
presentment, which is (on this view) to reduce the role of factions in government. On this
view, for the Court to uphold the legislative veto might move public law farther away
from, rather than closer to, the structure and purposes of the original Constitution. Now
this view may be wrong. The problem is that it is no simple task to identify the
commitments of the Constitution that are to be translated to fit with modern
circumstances. As with purposes, so with commitments: There is no simple task of
discovery here.
We are confident that Lessig would not disagree with this claim. But from the
institutional perspective, the idea that judges should translate original structures by
searching for offsetting constitutional adjustments is defective if unaccompanied by an
account of judicial capacities. It takes great confidence in those capacities to think that
judges can identify the net effects of such large-scale reforms with enough precision to
warrant jettisoning clear constitutional provisions and settled constitutional rules. The
overall effect of the legislative veto, or of its invalidation, is a major research question for
experts in political science.173 There is little reason to believe that generalist judges,
devoting a brief time to the subject and possessed of limited information, can form even a
plausible view of the relevant complexities. Judicial competence is not the only the
problem with idea of translation through compensating adjustments; there are serious
conceptual puzzles as well.174 But for our purposes the important objection is that
the interstate commerce power better captured the original understanding. See 514 U.S. at --- (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
169
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translation assumes an optimistic account of the judges’ abilities as translators, an
account that becomes increasingly questionable as judicial departures from text and
original expectations become increasingly ambitious, and as the systemic effects of the
adjustment become increasingly difficult for generalist judges to predict.
Some generalizations. We can generalize these points about Dworkin, Amar and
Lessig in two ways; both are familiar from the earlier, institutional account of statutory
interpretation. The first point is that a master principle of constitutional authority—law as
integrity (Dworkin), or the primacy of constitutional text (Amar), or fidelity through
translation (Lessig)—taken by itself, can yield no conclusions at all about proper
interpretive method. With a certain assessment of judicial capacities, judges might do
better, by Amar’s own lights, with clause-bound interpretation than with intratextualism.
On Lessig’s own premises, fallible judges might be better translators if they stick to the
unambitious transliteration that Lessig disparages. As for Dworkin, consider the
possibility that a fallible judge charged with implementing law-as-integrity might do
better, from the moral point of view, by opting for a relatively mechanical adherence to
prior rulings, described at a low level of generality, than by ambitiously attempting to
bring principled coherence to large areas of law. Thus an epistemically humble
Dworkinian judge might look a great deal like the incremental, common-law
constitutional jurist, who defers to precedent on the basis of a Burkean appreciation of the
limits of individuals’ cognitive capacities.175
The second, larger point is the possibility of incompletely theorized agreements
about interpretive method in constitutional cases. Interpreters who hold various firstorder accounts of constitutional authority might, for example, converge on a practice of
clause-bound precedent. The Amarian would do so to avoid large-scale, coherent
mistakes by fallible intratextualist judges; the Dworkinian would do so because any more
ambitious attempt at justificatory ascent might predictably do worse, on Dworkin’s own
criteria of moral integrity, in the hands of judges who do not resemble Hercules,
Dworkin’s idealized judge. Moreover, where agreements of this sort are possible, the
underlying disagreements between competing accounts of the Constitution’s authority
could be bracketed or ignored; with respect at least to the role of precedent, it would be
possible to choose an approach to interpretation without committing to any such first-best
position.
To be sure, any of these stories might or might not be plausible; the empirical
agenda we mean to sketch would consist of investigations along these and similar lines.
The important point is just that constitutional interpretation is not the same in a secondbest world as in a first-best world. As with statutes, so with the Constitution: any account
of constitutional interpretation that overlooks the decisive role of institutional
considerations is for that reason defective.
A note on tradition in constitutional law. These ideas very much bear on the
continuing debate about the proper role of tradition in constitutional law. Justice Scalia,
critical factor, among others, in deciding upon the proper scope of the transactional frame is the capacity of
judges to manage the increased complexity of larger frames.
175
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among others, has urged that in the face of textual ambiguity, judges should follow
traditions described at a low-level of generality. They should not strike down legislation
unless it contravenes actual practices as vindicated by history.176 “We refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified.”177 It would be possible to defend this approach on
Burkean grounds, with the claim that longstanding practices are likely to be justified, or
good, by virtue of their historical pedigree. And for those who dislike Burke, it would be
possible to respond that longstanding practices might reflect power or arbitrariness, and
hence that tradition is a bad source of constitutional law and in particular of constitutional
rights.178 Much of the debate over tradition has been cast in these terms.
With an institutional focus, the debate looks very different. Perhaps traditionalism
is best defended on the ground that judges are highly fallible human beings, and that if
they are unmoored from either text or traditions, they might well make mistakes.179 In
fact we could imagine a society, different but not unrecognizably from our own, in which
this defense of traditionalism would be convincing to a diverse group of people. Suppose,
for example, that political processes functioned extremely well, in the sense that unjust or
ill-considered outcomes were highly unlikely, and were corrected politically when they
occurred. Suppose too that in such a nation, judges were likely to make big blunders, in
the form of decisions that were confused or even invidious, and very hard to correct once
made. In such a society, tradition might well be the best foundation of constitutional
rights where text is unclear. Perhaps other bright-lines rules—such as a strong
presumption in favor of upholding enacted law—would be better still. The point is that an
evaluation of traditionalism, as of any other interpretive method, is partly empirical, and
based on an assessment of how different institutions are likely to perform under the
various alternatives. Without some empirical projections, it is hard to venture sensible
answers.
D. The Common Law
Our emphasis has been on the interpretation of texts, taken as the sorts of
commands found in constitutions, statutes, and regulations. But precedents are of course
texts too, and in deciding what a precedent means, a common law court should pay close
attention to institutional considerations. This point is often well-understood in the
common law context, especially in the academic literature on contract interpretation,180
but not always, for academics often evaluate common law decisions simply by asking
whether the existing cases can be unified by an attractive conceptual principle. That is not
the question courts should ask; at least it is not the only question. When common law
judges, as opposed to theorists of the common law, decide whether to characterize
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precedents narrowly or broadly, the questions of judicial fallibility and of dynamic effects
are central.
Consider two currently disputed issues frequently faced by common law courts:
whether to expand employee protection against at-will discharge181 and whether to cabin
punitive damage awards by juries.182 It would be possible to analyze precedents in a style
akin to Dworkin’s, asking what principle puts them in the most attractive light. Under this
approach, some people would undoubtedly conclude that courts should limit the power of
employers to discharge employees, eventually creating, perhaps, a right to be fired only
on job-related grounds. And other people would undoubtedly erect barriers to apparently
unreasonable punitive damage awards, expanding judicial power of remittitur to ensure,
for example, a sensible relationship between the compensatory award and the punitive
award.
It should be clear that any effort to proceed in this way should pay close attention
to two problems. First, judges might not know what they are doing. In the labor market,
for example, some observers suggest that arbitrary discharges are actually rare,183 and
that a right to be discharged only for job-related reasons would not really protect
deserving employees, but increase meritless litigation, with employees being the victims
(through reduced wages or employment). Any significant shift in the common law could
have large systemic effects on the employment market, and courts are not in a good
position to anticipate those effects. With respect to punitive damages, it is not so clear
that there should be a sensible relationship, all of the time, between the compensatory
award and the punitive award. If, for example, the injury is very hard to detect in most
cases, the standard economic approach calls for a large multiplier. In any case state
legislators have been very much involved in the process of considering relevant reforms.
There has been active debate, in many states, about the permissible grounds for
discharge, and even more active debate about cabining large punitive damage awards.
Perhaps judicial decisions, attractive in principle, would dampen those debates. Perhaps
cautious and incremental judgments, less attractive in principle, would represent a form
of deference to ongoing processes that are more likely to settle the relevant areas well.
Here as elsewhere we do not mean to reach a final judgment on the issues in
question. And by drawing attention to institutional considerations in the common law
setting, we hope that we are not saying anything surprising or novel. Too often, however,
the institutional considerations are placed in the background, and the interpretation of
precedents is undertaken in a way that is indifferent to them.
Conclusion
We have argued that issues of legal interpretation cannot be adequately resolved
without attention to institutional issues. An extraordinary variety of distinguished people
have explored interpretive strategies without attending to the fact that such strategies will
inevitably be used by fallible people and with likely dynamic effects extending far
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beyond the case at hand. Two mechanisms seem principally responsible for this
institutional blindness. One is a role-related trap: interpretive theorists ask themselves
“how would I decide the case, if I were a judge?”—a question whose very form
suppresses the key consideration that the relevant interpretive rules are to be used by
judges rather than theorists. Another is a cognitive trap: specialists, such as legal
academics, criticize the insufficiently nuanced opinions issued by generalist judges in
particular cases, overlooking that the same judges might well have done far worse, over a
series of cases, by attempting to emulate the specialists’ approach. Overall, the key
question seems to be, "how would perfect judges decide cases?" rather than "how should
fallible judges proceed, in light of their fallibility and their place in a complex system of
private and public ordering?"
Our minimal submission has been that answers to the former question are
hopelessly inadequate. We have argued as well that in some cases, an appreciation of
judicial fallibility and of dynamic effects will enable people to converge on an
appropriate approach despite their disagreements about the right path for perfect judges to
follow. At the very least, an appreciation of institutional questions should make it
possible for people to have a better appreciation of what they are disagreeing about, and
also of strategies for making some progress in the future. We have emphasized the
importance of asking about the likelihood of legislative oversight and correction; the
values of planning and predictability, and the effects, on these values, of one or another
interpretive choice in the particular context; and the actual performance of courts that
follow textualism, purposivism, or some other approach. Here there is much room for
empirical work, involving, for example, the nature and effects of different interpretive
approaches within different states, the responsiveness of state legislatures to those
different approaches, and the possible connection between formality in interpretation and
legislative attentiveness in various domains of law.
If we evaluate interpretive issues in institutional terms, we will not necessarily
adopt any particular approach to interpretation. But we have suggested that once the
question is properly framed, it becomes easy to see why reasonable people might favor a
formalist approach to statutes in some or many contexts, not on the basis of indefensible
ideas about how words work, but on simple institutional grounds. On this view,
formalism might be accepted, not because the Constitution requires it (it doesn't), and not
because formalism is required by a proper understanding of the concept of law (it isn't),
but when and because formalism is the best path for generalist judges who are often illequipped to resolve the policy issues at stake. For the same reasons, we have indicated
some enthusiasm for the emerging view that administrative agencies ought to be allowed
a degree of flexibility in their own interpretations, flexibility that goes well beyond that
of courts. Agencies are in a better position to know whether a particular result, apparently
compelled by text, really is senseless. They are also in a better position to know whether
a departure from text will unsettle the regulatory scheme in a damaging way. If agencies
ought not to be given this interpretive flexibility, it is also for institutional reasons, as, for
example, in the claim that agencies are subject to the influence of powerful private
groups, or in the suggestion that Congress will provide sufficiently prompt corrections of
regulatory decisions that, while faithful to statutory text, produce significant harm. Of
course there are many empirical issues here.
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In many ways the question of constitutional law is harder, simply because people
disagree so sharply about what constitutes a good outcome. Ironically, however,
constitutional law has already witnessed a significant if partial institutional turn: Many
people emphasize that any approach to the Constitution must take account of the
institutional strengths and weaknesses of the judiciary. Even here, however, we have seen
that influential voices in constitutional law argue in favor of interpretive strategies in a
way that is inadequately attuned to the issue of institutional capacities. Those who
emphasize philosophical arguments, or the idea of holistic or intratextual interpretations,
seem to us to have given far too little attention to institutional questions. Here as
elsewhere, our minimal submission is that a claim about appropriate interpretation is
incomplete if it does not pay attention to considerations of administrability, judicial
capacities, and systemic effects in addition to the usual imposing claims about legitimacy
and constitutional authority. But we have also suggested the possibility that in
constitutional law, an assessment of those issues might lead to convergence, on
appropriate methods, from those who disagree about what ideal judges should do. The
New Deal period culminated in a convergence of this kind. In the current period, it is
revealing that many people, from their diverse points of view, now seem decreasingly
satisfied with the idea that judges should interpret ambiguous constitutional provisions in
a way that seems, to those judges, best on grounds of political morality.
Our major goal here has not, however, been to argue on behalf of any particular
approach to interpretation. Our ambition has been at once narrower and more critical-- to
show that interpretive theory, as elaborated by its most able practitioners, has been
remarkably indifferent to institutional issues, proceeding as if judges are reliable and as if
their choice of approach lacks systemic consequences. We think that this indifference is a
kind of pathology, produced, in large part, by the legal culture's continuing insistence on
framing the question of interpretation as, "What would you do, when faced with a
problem of this sort?" We hope to have shown that this is a misleading question to ask,
and one that has quite damaging consequences not only for the academic study of law,
but for legal institutions as well. Once the question is properly reframed, it should be
possible to see interpretive questions in a new and better light, and perhaps to adopt new
and better answers as well.
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